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DEMOCRACY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
INDMDUAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ORGANIZATIONS

•

ANDREA K. SCHNEIDER

1. INTRODUCTION

The question of dispute resolution systems for international
organizations is of growing importance. Not only has there been
a plethora of new international and regional organizations created
in the last few years, but this trend is likely to continue. There
are numerous proposals for multilateral free trade areas and
agreements across Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in
1
Asia. · At the same time, existing international trade organizations have come under increasing scrutiny for their inability to
reflect accurately the needs and concerns of the citizens of the
·
member states.
For example, the debate about fast track authority for the
Clinton Administration reflects concerns about the benefits of
free trade agreements to the U.S. economy and fears that increased free trade with less developed states will lead to an elimination of jobs in certain manufacturing .sectors. 2 This debate fo' Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. J.D.,
Harvard Law School; A.B., Princeton University. I would like to thank Jeffery
Atik, Steve Charnovitz and Frank Garcia for their insightful comments and
questions. John McDonald and Sara Cobb also provided helpful feedback. An
early draft of this Article was presented at the conference Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach, sponsored by the International Economic
Law Interest Group of the American Society of International Law. I appreciate
the valuable comments from the conference participants. Many thanKS also go
to Maria Cheryan and Emily Canedo for their superior research assistance.
1
See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, "Americas Agreements~-An Interim Stage in
Buildin~e Free Trade Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63
{1997) Cliscussing implementation of the Free Trade Area); Paul A. O'Hop, Jr.,

Hemtsp ·c Integratwn and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles Under a NAFTA·
Based System, 36 HARv. INT'L L.J. 127 {1995) {discussing importance of
NAFTA to the establishment of tlie free trade zone in the Western Hemisphere); Merit Janow, Assessing APEC's Role in Economic Integration in the AsiaPacifc Regwn, 17 Nw. J.INT'L~. & Bus. 947 (1997).
· .
Fast track allows the President to negotiate trade pacts and submit them
to Congress for up-or-down votes, with no amendments allowed See Peter
Baker & Paul Bluestein, Clinton Searches for MicJ4le on 'Fast Track', .WASH.
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cuses on whether it is even in our citizens' interests for the United
States to join international trade organizations. Meanwhile,
across the Atlantic Ocean, the ongoing debate about the
"democracy deficit" in the European Union ("EU") demonstrates
the concern with the decreased ability of citizens to have a say in
what the laws are under the EU. 3 This debate focuses on the ability of citizens to influence lawmakers in the substantive laws that
directly affect their lives. In both of these debates, people have
examined the legitimacy of international trade organizations and
debated ways of structurinf these organizations to be more democratic and more legitimate.
POST, Sept. 11, 1997, at AS. Fast track supporters argt~e that without fast track,
it would be impossible for the United States to conclude deals with other nations because the agreements are subject to Congressional approval. Many nations are hesitant to negotiate agreements when they know that Congress can
reopen them in the approval process and force further negotiations. See, e.g.,
Bob Dole & Lloyd Bentsen, Editorial, 'Fast Track' Issue Deserves Fast Action,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at A31. Supporters of fast track generally favor increased free trade. Those opposed to fast track are those more doubtful of the
benefits offree trade and harmonization of standards, including labor and environmental groups. See Linda Clerkin, Shut Up and Take Your Medicine: Will

International Laws Force Vitamins 0/JU.S. Shelves?

CITY EDmON: THE WKLY

NEWSPAPER OF MILWAUKEE, Nov. 20, 1997 ("We believe that each nation's
needs are unique, and it shouldn't be up to an international group to decide
what laws best govern that nation. It should be up to those nations themselves.") (quoting Susan Haeger, Executive Director of Citizens for Health protesting harmonized guidelines for vitamins and minerals under CODEX). For
a discussion that links current trends in international trade and the economy
towards strengthening the argument .for fast track, see the vie~oint by the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for international economic pohcy from 1989
to 1993, in Thomas J. Duesterberg, Selling the Free-Trade Story, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1997, at BU9. For a view of whether fast track is necessary to accomplish trade pacts, see David Sanger, The Trade Bill: The Impact, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1997, at A6, and also see Lori Wallach,Fast Track Trade Authority:
Wbo Needs Fast Track?, J. COM., Sept. 19, 1997, at 9A. Although fast track
authority was not granted last year, 1t is clear that the debate over free trade in
general and fast track in particular will recur.
' See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J..
2403, 2466-74 (1991). Weiler's article describes "democracy aeficit" as the ability of the unelected branches of the EU, the Council and the Commission to
pass legislation overriding laws passed by the national parliaments. In other
words, it is possible for Citizens of a certain member state to be required to follow a law for which neither they nor their duly elected representatives voted.
Democracy deficit also refers to the comparative lack of political power in the
only elected EU body, the Parliament.. See generally Anne-Marie Burley, Democracy and Judicial Review in the European Communiry, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 81 (1992) (examining the roles of legis1ative and judic1al bodies in the EU).
4
For example, the Environmental Side Agreement of the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") was designed to assuage concerns about in-
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This article takes a different approach to understanding ques5
tions of legitimacy and democracy in international organizations
by examining the dispute resolution mechanisms used in these organizations. An alternative method of assessing legitimacy and
democracy in international organizations would be to look at the
ability of private actors to enforce rules once they are enacted.
Ultimately, I shall argue that increasing individual involvement in
dispute resolution-by granting private actors rights and standing
under these organizations-is an appropriate way to increase the
legitimacy of international trade organizations.
Section 2 of this Article reviews the general arguments surrounding democracy in international organizations. I will examine the increased role of private actors in international law as advocated by liberal international relations theory, the arguments
6
surrounding the democracy deficit in the EU, and the issue of
capture by narrow political interests reflected in the debate over
fast track authority.
·
In order to understand different levels of individual involvement in dispute resolution, Section 3 of this Article examines
some factors in determining different types of dispute resolution
mechanisms. These factors-direct effect, standing, supremacy,
transparency and enforcement-all reflect different levels of involvement between the trade organization and the citizens under
it.
The Section 4 of this Article makes the argument that increased individual involvement will increase democracy in these
trade organizations. This involvement will increase the role of
private actors in lawmaking, make enforcement of the original
trade agreement more likely, reduce the danger of capture by naradequate enforcement of environmental laws in Mexico and the resulting con·
cern about a "race-to-the-bottom"-the fear that companies would relocate
there in order to take advantage of the lax enforcement. See North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
5
In an attem('t to give some defmition to ambiguous and critical terms, I
use the term "legitimacy" to refer to the lawfulness and appropriateness of these
international organizations, as well as the perceived fairness and justice resulting
from these agreements. "Democracy" refers to the representative and participatory aspects of international organizations.
6
See Treary Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for
signature Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958)
[liereinafter the EEC TREATY].
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row interests, increase the transparency of these trade organizations and, in the end, make organizations themselves more effective. Finally, Section 5 concludes the Article.
2. DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

There are three critiques of international organizations that
can shed light on the involvement of private actors.

2.1.

Liberal International Relatiom Theory

The first argument comes from the liberal international relations theory ("liberal IR.") of political science, which has now
been more regularly applied to international law? Liberal IR. ar8
gues that previous international relations theories, such as realism
and regime theory/ are too state-based in their assessment of international relations. Liberal IR. focuses on the actors behind the
veil of the state, looking at how the state is organized and who
has power, in order to understand the motivations and interactions of states in the international realm. In examining dispute
resolution, several proponents of liberal IR. have looked at the
European system a11d the role of private actors for explaining its
1
success.
Furthermore, scholars have focused on how intern:a-

°

7

See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Ageiula, 87 AM. J. INr'LL. 205 (1993) (proJ>osin!\ application of "liberal" international relations theory to internat10niil law); AnneMarie Slaughter, 7be Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory
and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
377 (1994) (discussing liberal conception of the United Nations); David P.
Fidler, LiBER TAD v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the Helms-Burton Act From
Within Liberal International Relations 7beory, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
297 (1997) (using liberal IR to examine U.S. legislation).
8
See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INr'L L. 335, 336-38 (1989); see also
Burley, supra note 7, at 214-18 (discussing realism theory). For more on applying realism to international trade see generally ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER
AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: THE POLfTICAL ECONOMY OF
FOREIGN DIRECT lNvEslMENT (1975), and HANs J. MORGENTHAU, Pormcs
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE {5th ed. 1973).
9
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1983) {Steehen D. Krasner ed.);
Friedrich Kratochwil & John G. Ruggie,lnternational Urganization: A State of
theArton an Art of the State, 40 INr'L ORG. 753 (1986); Burley, supra note 7, at
218-20.
1
For a Kantian .,;,planation of liberal governance and the relation to international trade, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 23-24 {1997); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication 107 YALE

°
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tiona! relations theories might reflect themselves in different dispute resolution models in a variety of international trade organi•
11
zat1ons.
This article attempts to build on this body of work by using
the major beliefs of liberal IR to evaluate different models of international dispute resolution. Liberal IR argues that (1) private
actors are the fundamental actors in society; (2) governments reflect some segment of society; and, (3) states behave according to
their preferences. 12 This article examines the extent to which private actors are given roles in international dispute resolution and
the impact this has on the international organization as well as
their domestic government. I will examine how different dispute·
resolution models result in different segments of society being
represented by their governments and how different models reflect and change state actions and preferences.
2.2.

Democracy Deficit

A more direct line of attack on the legitimacy of international
organizations comes from many of the scholars focusing on the
EU. The argument here is that, as power has been centralized in
the EU and as laws are increasingly passed at the EU level, citizens of member states actually have less ability to influence legislation.13 What started as a union of democratic states actually reL.J. 273 (1997);Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International
Organizations, 17 Nw. J. lNT'LL. & Bus. 398, 424-27 (1997); Walter Mattli &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Constructing the European Community Legal System from
the Ground Up: The Role of Indiviilual Litigants and Na.tional Courts (Harvard
Law School, Harvard Jean Monnet Chair Working Papers, No. 1/95}, available
at Jonathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet Chair (visited Apr. 4, 1998}
<http://www.law.harvard.edU/Programs/JeanMonnet/ >.
11
Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the
Law of International Trade, 26 HARV. lNT'L L.J. 501 (1985} (applying realist
theory to international trade}; Frank J. Garcia, Decisionmalemg and Dispute

Resolution in the Free Trade Area of the Americas:An Essay in Trade Governance,
18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 357 (1997} (apJ?lying mesoinstitutton theory to the Free
Trade Area of the Americas); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Or!!anization, 44 DUKE
L.J. 829 (1995} (setting forth three models of dispute resolUtion based on three
theoreticil premises}.
12
See Burley, supra note 7, at 227-28.
·
13
See Weiler, supra note 3; Weiler, et a!., European Democracy and Its Critique-Five Uneasy Pieces (Harvard Law School, Harvard Jean Monnet Chair
Workin~ Papers, No. 1/95), available at Jonathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet
Chair (viSited Apr. 4, 1998} <http://www.law.harvard,edu/Programs/
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suits in less democracy for their citizens. In order to remedy this
deficit of democracy, some argue that citizens must be given more
direct representation at the EU level through the Parliament.
Some of the reforms of the European Parliament in the Single
European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht are explained by the
desire to give citizens more direct voice in EU legislation. 14 Others argue that the EU has tried (unsuccessfully) to ease concerns of
democracy by greater transparency and legislative review. 15 Citizen participation in trade policy has also become a focus of environmental and public interest groups looking at U.S. trade policy16 in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") 17
and the World Trade Organization ("WT0"). 18
JeanMonnet/ >.
14
To partially remedy the democracy deficit, the MaaStricht Treaty created a co-decision procedure, which essentially gives the European Parliament a
legislative veto on some matters. See TREATY EsTABL!SHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, Feb. 7 1992, art. 189b, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] C.M.L.R. 573
(1992) [hereinafter. EC TREATY]; see also Alan Dashwood., Community Legis/a·
tive Procedures in the Era of the Treaty on EurofJ<!'n Union, 19 EUR. L. REV. 343
(1994) (discussing changes .to l"$islative procedures resulting from Treaty on
EU); Trevor Hartley, Constitutzonal and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht
Agreement, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 213, 224-26 (1993); Dieter Kugelmann, The
Maastricht Treaty and the Design of a European Federdl State, 8 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 335, 346-48 (1994) (discussing relationship between the Treaty and
democracy).
IS See, e.g., Juliet Lodge, Transpdrency and Democratic Legitimacy, 32 J.
COMM. MKT. STUD. 343 (1994); Imelda Maber, Legislative Review by the EC
Commission, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION 235, 238-240 Go
Shaw and Gillian More eds., 1995).
16
See, e.g., DANIEL C. EsT¥, .GREENING THE GATT (1994); Daniel C.
Esty, NGO's at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Ex·
elusion, (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript on Hie with author); Patti Goldman,
The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27
CORNELL INT'L L J. 631 (1994) (arguing that the secrecy and lack of public input in U.S. trade policy results in a policy that is biased toward trade liberalizatio~ at the ex_pense. of other values); Robert F. Housman,Democratizi~g In~
natwnal Trade Decmon·makmg, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699 (1994) (discl!Ssmg
undemocratic nature of international trade decision-making); Paul B. Stephan,
Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17
NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681 (1997). Furthermore, in response to complaints
about lack of transparency, a U.S. District Court ordered the United States
Trade Representative to grant public access to submissions to GATT dispute
resolution panels. See Public Cnizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 804 F. Supp. 385 (D.D.C. 1992).
17
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. AJ, 55
U.N. T.S.187 [hereinafter GATT].
18
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Mulitlateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE
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However, a focus on the democracy deficit alone is too narrow. In this view, the level of representation of private actors is
solely measured in the legislative process. Yet the legislative
prowess is only part of the equation. Lawmaking also occurs in
the judicial branch of the EU, through the European Court of
Justice. Additionally, the greatest changes in breadth, scope, and
power of the EU have come from the Court, not from legisla19
tion. Therefore, it is also appropriate-and indeed necessary-to
examine who has the power to compel judicial change. In the
EU, ironically, its citizens have the greatest ability to participate
in the dispute resolution process. Instead of a democracy deficit,
the EU comes closest to achieving democracy in its dispute resolution mechanism compared to other international trade organizations.
2.3.

Trade Liberalism Versus Political Capture by Narrow
Interests

A final critique of international trade examines the relationship between the state and its constituents. It is widely believed
that trade liberalism, while making economic sense to most states
23
is difficult to implement in the face of nationalist interests.
First, at the U.S. political level, it has been argued that the executive branch is the logical protector of free trade, while Congress is
more likely to want to protect narrow, industrial, protectionist
interests. 21 Therefore, it is important that the President be given
power over trade policy so that the broader economic interests of
the state, and consumers and exporters in particular, will be protected from the well-funded, well-organized importer lobby. Second, on the international level, it has been argued that less transURUGUAY Round vol. 1. (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (hereinafter WTO
Agreement].
19
Weiler, supra note 3, at 2411-20.
20
See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); see also Frederick M. Abbott, Trade and
Democratic Values, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 9, 17-18 (1992) (explaining
Adam Smith's and David Ricardo's economic theories in favor of a hberal trading~em).
2

See DANIEL VERDIER, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 275
(1994}; BETH V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION
AND GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 11 (1992}; C. O'Neal Taylor,

Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: WhY the NAFTA Turned
Into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH.J.INT'LL. &ECON. 1,18-21 (1994).

594
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parency for trade deals is useful in shielding trade agreements

. ofh
. a!'mterests.22
t ese natton
from scrutmy

Again, I suggest that this analysis of international trade relations overlooks the important dimension of dispute resolution.
The concerns of capture are not only prevalent at the deal making
stage. Whether or not a trade agreement is enforced clearly brings
all of the same elements to the table.23 Enforcement can separate
interests along the importer-exporter divide, along the manufacturer-consumer divide, between industries, or between companies.
Different methods of dispute resolution can either recognize or
.
.
tgnore
t he 1ssue
of capture. 24
The involvement of private actors in. the dispute resolution
mechanisms of trade organizations has the ability to reduce the
25
linkage between trade and domestic political interests.
While
theoretically this link allows governments to be more responsive
to their citizens, in reality, the link between trade and politics
keeps governments tethered to special and well-organized interest
22
See Philip M. Nichols, Participation of Nong:rvernmental Parties in the
World Trade ~anization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 295, 319 (1996) ("It can

be argued that t!ie low public·proft!e of.international trade policy has been one
of the largest contributors to trade liberalization over the past fifty years.").
23
See Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Sowreignty and Regionalism, 27 LAW &
POL'y lNT'L Bus. 1073, 1075 (1996} (arguing that supranational dispute settlement can "transcend the day-to-day political maneuvering of member states, local bureaucracies, and interest groups"}.
24
"The nature of these [GATT] proceedings is not over co.nflicts of interests among countries but between the general Interest of consumers in liberal
trade and the general interests of the taxpayers in an efficient government and
the interests in trade protectionism. They are about redistributiOn of income at
home." ASIL BULLETIN, No, 9, !MPUCATIONS OF TifE PROUFERATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATORY BODIES FOR DISPUTE REsOLUTION 44
(1995} (statement of Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann};see also John H. Barton & Barry
E. Carter, International Law and I115titutions for a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535,
550, 560 (1993} (arguing that individual.s ouglit to be able to enforce and invoke
international law).
25
By using the term "political interest," I am denoting those negative connotations of narrow, spectal or otherwise inappropriate interests that can capture the polity. For more general information on public choice theory, see
DANIELA. FARBER& PHILIPP. fluCKEY, LAW ANDl'uBUC CHOICE (1991};
CHARLES K. ROWLEY & WlLLEM THORBECKE, THE ROLE OF CONGRESS AND
TifE EXECUTIVE IN U.S. TRADE POUCY DETERMINATION: A PUBUC CHOICE
ANALYSIS IN NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993};KAY SCHLOZMAN
& JOHN TIERNEY, 0RGAN1ZED INTERESTS AND AMERICA DE¥0CRACY, 33946 (1986}; Paul B.,.S;ephan, III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory
and Internationar Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745 (1995);
Symposium, Theory ofPublic Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167-518.
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groups. 26 Once a state has determined that it is in its national interest to join a trade organization and once rules are adopted under that organization, the link to domestic political interests can
be reduced by giving private actors standing to enforce the agreement. In that way governments will be responsible for following
27
the rules across the board rather than selectively.
3. FACTORS IN DETERMINING MODELS OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION

Now that I have set forth some of the critiques of the international trade system, this Article can turn to better understanding
the dispute resolution options. In order to determine the level of
28
individual involvement there are several factors to examine.

3.1.
3.1.1.

Direct Effect ofRights
Definition

The first factor is whether private actors are directly granted
rights under the international treaty establishing the trade organization. The term "self-executing" comes from the idea that the
treaty executes itself without further legislative action. For those
who study EU law, the rights under the Treaty of Rome and

26

See Jeffery Atik, Identifving Antidemocratic Outcomes: Authenticity, Self
Sacrifice aizd International Tri.de, in Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon: A
Multidisciplinary Approach, 19 U. PA. J.INT'LECON. L. 201 (1998).
27
For more on hOw Private actors cah enhance government compliance,
see Matt Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for lnterna·
tiona/ Trade Agreements to Perform Constitutional Functions with Respect to SubFederal Governments?, 17 Nw. J.INT'LL. & Bus. 609 (1996-97).
28
The factors listed in this section are no doubt incomplete .. Other factors of
inquiry could include the precedential value of decisions, whether the decision is
suoject to review or appeal, and whether th.e panel is rotatin~r stan.din~. See, e.g.
Louis F. Del Duca, Teachings of the European Commurlity
erience or De:vel·
oping Regional Organizations, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 485 1993); hilip M.
Nicliols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. lNT'L L. 379 (1996); Miquel Montana I
Mora A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of lnterna·
tionat Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1993). I have chosen
not to discuss those factors because they .focus on those dispute resolution systems
that already have some sort of decision-making body. ThiS study takes a broader
approach and does not assume the existence of any such tribunal.
·

U. Pa. f Int'l Econ. L

596

[Vol19:2
29

other legislation have been called "directly applicable" and are
said to have "direct effect. "3° For the purposes of this Article, the
differences among the three phrases will be overlooked/ 1 and I
will use the term "direct effect" to mean those treaties that give
private actors immediate rights and under which no further domestic legislative action is necessary.
3.1.2.

Why Directly Effective Rights Are Important

Directly effective rights are an important issue in treaty law
because the scope and depth of the treaty will vary depending on
whether private actors will also be involved in the implementation of the treaty. Those treaties under which private actors get
rights give these private actors another legal basis for protecting
their rights under the law.
The issue of direct effect globally has most commonly arisen
under human rights treaties, which are clearly drafted in order to
protect and benefit individuals. 32 In the United States, the continual debate over self-executing treaties re-emerges every time a
new h1.1man rights treaty comes up for ratification in the U.S.
Senate. The Senate is traditionally reluctant to grant direct effect
to these treaties because these treaties may provide additional
29

See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Trans{'ort-en Expeditie Onderneming
Van Gend en Loos v. NederlandSe Administrat1e der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1
[hereinafter Van Gend en Loos).
30
See Case 106/77, Amministrazione Delle Finanze Delio Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (ll), 1978 E.C.R. 629; see also, Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effects of
International Economic Law in the United States and the EU, 17 Nw. J. oo'L L.
& Bus. 556 (1996-97); Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect": An Infant
Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155 (1983). For discussion of
"direct effect• see T. HARTI.EY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN
CoMMUNTIYLAW 183-218 (1988).
31
This is not to say that the difference between direct applicability and direct effect is not important or has not occupied many {'ages of academic discussion. See, e.g., J.A. Winter, Direct Applica/3ility and D•rect Effect:· Two Distinct
and Different Concepts in Commumty Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 425
(197~.
3

See, e.g., Convention AJ!;ainst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishr...ent, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20;
Tntemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for sirPture Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter
ICCPR); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of t e Crime of
Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see also David Weissbrodt,
United States &tification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35
(1978) (discussing the Human Rights Covenants and President Carter's proposaJs for tbem).
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rights not provided under the Constitution. 33 In keeping with the
Senate's traditional isolationist approach to foreign relations, the
idea that international law may differ or go further than U.S. domestic law remains anathema to many members of Congress and
other citizens. 34 Thus, when the United States recently ratified
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), the United States made a specific reservation stating
that the ICCPR would not be self-executing. 35 This has been the
typical practice with most recently ratified human rights treaties.
International trade treaties in the United States are also traditionally not self-executing. 36 They usually need additional implement" For example, the ICCPR calls for the elimination of the death penalty
for juveniles under 18. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has held that
the death penalty is permitted against juveniles to the age of 16. See Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
W. hile many countries around the world have eliminated the death eenalty, the
United States has expanded its use. See International Comm'n of jurists, Ad·
ministration of the Death Penalty in the United States, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 165
(1997).
34
.
See, e.g., U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH
OR WITHOUT REsERVATIONS, (Richard B. Lillich ed, 1981); M. Cheri£ Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169 (1993)
(discussing the U.S. concerns in ratification of the ICCPR); Kerri Ann Law,
Hope for the Future: Overcoming jurisdictional Concerns to Achieve United States
Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
1851 (1994) (discussing the reasons the United States should ratify the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child); Ann Elizabeth Mayer,Ref/ec·
tions on the Proposed United States Reservations to CEDA W: Should the Constitu·
tion Be an ObStacle to Human Rights?, 23 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727 (1996)
(discussing the U.S. reaction to Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women); Jordan J. Paust,Avoiding 'Fraudulent' Execu·

tive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-EX£cution of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257 (1993) (Ciiscussing the U.S. decision to make

ICCPR non-self-executing).
35
The ICCPR was adopted by the United States on September 8, 1992.
The U.S. Senate gave the requisite advice and consent to the treaty, together
with the declaration "[t ]hat tlie United States declares that the yrovis10ns of Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing. . . . 138CONG. REG
54,784; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-93 (1994) (setting fortli the implementing langua~e of the Genocide Convention).
6
See JOHN H JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POUCY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 79-105 (1997) {discussing
broadly U.S. law and the application of international trade treaties); John H.
Jackson, U.S. Constitutional Law Principles and Foreign Trade Law and Policy, in
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 65
(Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) (reviewing the history
of the application of trade treaties in U.S.law).
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ing legislation or rule-making in order to have any force in domestic U.S. law.
On the other hand, when we discuss trade organizations, the
private actor involvement is .particularly appropriate. After all,
states intend to design trade treaties to encourage private actors to
import and export from other private actors. In order to encourage this trade, treaties require that states do not take actions that
would adversely affect these private actors. Historically, the very
basis of friendship, commerce and navigation treaties was to provide protection for private actors from unfair governmental
treatment. Even at the lowest level of economic interaction, bilateral investment treaties today require that governments treat
citizens and noncitizens equally. States grant private actors these
rights as national treatment37 or a minimum standard of treatment38 in the host state. Once states choose. to join international
Th~ notion that individuals granted tights under national treatment will
receive the same treatment as the state's nationals is referred to as the "Equality
of Treatment Doctrine." Though gaining popular sil.Pport world wide, it has
been the doctrine historically preferred by communiSt and Third World nations. "Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" between the U.S.
and other nations used the national treatment standard. See, e.g., Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. IV, para.
1, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2067. ("Nationals and companies of either Party shall lie accorded national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment with respect to
access to the courts of justice and to administrative tribunals and agencies
within the territories of the other Party ... both in pursuit and in defense of
their rights.").
38
According to the Minimum Standard of International Justice, a state
must accord an alien with at least a minimum standard of treatment, even if this
37

means a:n alien would ·receiVe better treatment -th:in the state's own nationals.

This doctrine was traditionally favored by Western nations, particularly with
regard to states with a poor record on human rights. However, third world nations have feared that the use of a minimum standard will be used as a cover for
privileged _status with regards to investments, inheritance and ownership of
property. See Greta Gainer, Nationalization: The Dichotomy Between Western
and Th:Td World Perspectives in International Law, 26 How. L.J. 1547 {1983).
Interestingly, more recent U.S. treaties combine both the national treatment
and the nunirnum standard. For example, in the one Treaty of Friendship with
Belgium it is written that
Each Contractin_g Party shall at all times accord equitable
treatment and effective protection to the persons, property,
enterprises, rights and interests of nationals and companies of
the other Party.... Nationals of either Contracting Party
within the temtories of the other Party shall be accorded full
legal and judicial protection for their persons, rights, and interests. Such nationals shall be free from molestation and
shall receive constant protection in no case less than reqnired
by international law. To this end they shall in particular have

1998]

DEMOCRACY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

599

trade organizations, the requirement of fair treatment for noncitizens includes freedom from unfair taxation, unfair government
regulation, unequal tariffs and unequal nontariff barriers. Basically, trade treaties provide a set of rights for private actors against
governments.
Yet, trade treaties are currently structured so as to provide
states these rights on behalf of their citizens rather than granting
these rights directly to the citizens. Because trade treaties most
affect private actorsj it only makes sense that these rights have appropriate remedies. 9 As Stefan Riesenfeld argued almost twentyright of access, on the same basis and on the same conditions
as nationals of such other Party, to the courts of justice and
administrative tribunals and agencies in all degrees of jurisdiction and shall have right to die services of competent persons
of their choice.
Treaty of Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1961, U.S.-Belg.,
arts. 1, 3(1), (2), 14 U.S.T. 1284, 1286, 1288-89; While in an investment treaty
with Argentina, it is written:

·

Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities. associated therewith, on a basis no less favorable. than that accorded in like sitUations to investment or asSociated aciivitifs
of its own nationals or companies, Or of nationals or .compa·

nies of any third country, whichever is the more favorable,
subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain exceptions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in die
Protocol to this Treaty... Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitabl~ treatmentbshall enjoy full protection
and secunty and shall m no case e accordeCI treatment less
than that required by international law.
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and .Protection of Investment, Nov., 14 1991, Arg-U.S., 31 I.L.M. 124.
,. As Andreas Lowenfeld stated,
I have never believed that a right without a remedy ·is no right
at all. But there can be no doubt that the closer a legal system
comes to affording remedies for breaches of rules, the stronger
are the rights it confers, and the more reliance can be placed
on the rules.
Andreas Lowenfelcl, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New
GA 1T, 88 AM. J. lNT'L L. 471, 488 (1994). For more on rights without remedies in the domestic context, see Richard H. Fallon, fr.,Individual Rights and
the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 1993 (giving context to individual's riidits in a structured society); Richard
Fa! on, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L.
REv. 1731 (1991) (examining the concept of"new" law in criminal cases from
the~erspective of the law of remedies in the constitutional context); Donald H.
Zei er, Rights Require Remedie~· A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights
in e Federal Courts, 38 HAsTINGS L.J. 665 (1987) (arguing that courts must
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five years ago, direct effect of rights and proper judicial remedies
4
are necessary to the continued development of free trade. ° Furthermore, without appropriate remedies, these rights often are left
unprotected and unenforced. Increased legitimacy and effectiveness of international trade organizations require individual involvement, not only at the sta~e of lawmaking, but also at the
1
stage of remedying lawbreaking.
3.1.3.

How Rights Become Directly Effective

In many states other than the United States, international
treaties are automatically self-executing and, at ratification, grant
individual citizens the rights outlined in the treaty on the same
basis as the state itself. Language granting individual ri~ts under
international treaties can be outlined in the constitution 2 or legislation. 43 Still other states grant individual rights under treaties
through the evolution of judicial decisions that have held the
rights to be self-executing or directly effective. 44 In the United
States, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Japanese
individual was granted rights directly under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation signed between Japan and the
United States. 45 Similarly, although direct effect was not clearly
presume enforcement of a law absent a showing that greater harm will occur to
a plaintiff from enforcing these rights).
'"' See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Le$al Systems ofRegional Economic Integration,
22 AM. J. CoMP. L. 415, 443 (1974).
41
In fact, the American Bar Association ("ABA") supported expanding the
right of private parties to bring cases under NAFTA. See Int'l Law and Practice
Section, American Bar Ass'n, Reports to the House of Delegates, 26 lNT'L LAW.
855, 859 (1992). See also, Joint Working Group on the Settlement of Int'l Disputes, Canadian and American Bar Ass'ns, Settlement ofDisputes Under the Proposed Free Trade A rea Agreement, 22 INT'L LAW 879 (1988) (proposing a reference procedure from national courts in which individuals coUld bring cases to a
Joint Canada-United States Free Trade Tribunal).
42
SeeSTATUUTNED. [Constitution] art. 91 (Neth.).
43
For example, under the law of the United Kingdom, "although the executive has a largely unfettered power to enter into treaty obligations, such obligations normally need to be transformed into domestic law oy legislation before they can be enforced by British courts." Nicholas Grief, Constitutional
Law and International Law, in UNITED KINGDOM LAW IN TiiE MID-19905
76,88 Q"ohn W. Bridge et a!. eds., 1994).
.
44
See Etat Beige, Ministre des Affaires Economiques c. Societe Anoyme
From~erie Franco-Suisse Le Ski', Cour des Cass., 158 Pasic. 1971-I (1971)
(Belfs) (ruling on the supremacy of the self-executing treaties over national law).
See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (detailing suit of a
Japanese national by the City of Seattle for the ability to open a pawn shop).
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written into the Treaty of Rome, the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") found that the rights in the treaty did have direct effect. 46
Under case law from the ECJ, citizens of member states of the
47
EU are also granted rights directly from EU legislation. This
direct effect under the Treaty of Rome is already quite revolutionary in comparison to most international treaties. 48 Because
the practice of granting direct effect varies by state, it is necessary
The Court quoting language from the treaty, "[t]he citizens ... of each of the
High Contracting Parties shall have the liberty to ... reside in the territories of
the otherto carry on trade ..." held in favor oft he Japanese national. See id. at
340. For more on self-executing treaties, see J ordaD. J. Paust, Self-Executing
Treaties, 82 AM J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); Carlos Manuel Vasg_ues, Ibe Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 695 (1995). See also Charles
D. Siegel, Individual Rights Under Self-Executing Extradition Treaties-Dr. AI·
varez Machain's Case, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP L. J. 765 (1991) (detailing
case ruling that a Mexican fugitive wanted for a U.S. murder who was kidnapped haa to be released because Mexico had protested under its rights under a
treaz).
·
See Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1. This decision was controversial at
the time and, it was argued, beyond the scope of the ECJ. See id., at 19
(Opinion of the Advocate General Karl Roemer) (protesting the decision); P.P.
Craig, Once upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization ofEEC
Law, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 458-63 (recounting criticisms of the
case).
47
The ECJ has interpreted the language of Article 189 as conferring rights
upon the nationals of Member States in certain circumstances. The direct effect
of the legislation, treaty article, or decision is, in essence, what constitutes the
right. The Court has Clistinguished vertical direct effect, the rights of an indiviaual to sue a governmental entitY,, from horizontal direct effect, the right of
an individual to sue another individual. The Court has acknowledged vertical
dire~ effect involving disputes arising from treaty articles, regulations, and d!rect,lves. See Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1; Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Naz!onale per L'Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R.585; Case 41/74, VanDuyn v. Home
Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337; Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & S.-W.
Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723. However, the Court has not
been so lenient on the rights of individuals established by horizontal direct effect. Although the Courts have reco~nized horizontal direct effect in disputes
arising from treaty articles and regulations, Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe
Anonyme Beige De Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455 the Court refuses to acknowledge horizontal direct effect in disputes arising from directives.
See Case 106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Commercial Internacional De Ali.
mentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. I-4135.
48
See Brand, supra note 30; David O'Keefe, Judicial Protection of the Individual by the European Court of justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 901 (1996);
Louis F. Del Duca, Teaching of t'he European Community Experience {or Developing Regional On!anizations, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 485 ft993). In fact, the EU
dOes not proviae direct effect for other international treaties including the
GATT. See Brand, supra note 30, at 575-93 (1997).
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to examine the language of the treaty, the member states' practices, and any judicial interpretations of the treaty.

3.2.
3.2.1.

Standing Before the Dispute Resolution Body
No Standing

Under some treaties, all disputes are resolved between states
through diplomacy. Alternatively, the dispute resolution system
is a court or tribunal that is only open to states, as is the case with
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). Evolving from the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, 49 the ICJ is the most recognized
international court. 50 In the trade arena, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding is closest to this type of international adjudication. In either instance, private actors have no official role
in dispute resolution.
Historically under international law, only a state could sue
another state and demand reparation for the injuries inflicted on
its citizens. The injured private actor did not have a directly enforceable claim against a state that violated his rights. 51 Therefore, it was up to each state to determine if, when, and how to
press claims for injury to its own citizens. 52 A state could clearly
choose not to pursue this remedy. 53
On July 29, 1899, at the first Ha~e Peace Conference, the Permanent
Court of Arbitration ("PCA") was estabhshed. The Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes detailed the PCA, which was to become
the first dispute settlement mechanism between sovereign states. See Bette E.
Shifman, The Revitalization of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 23 INT'L J.
49

LEGAL INFO. 284 (1995).
50

The Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") was established
in 1921 by the League of Nations. The Court, heard 32 cases and issued 27 advisory Oj>inions to international organizations. At the end of World War II,
the estaolishment of the United Nations (UN) sparked the need for a new
world court in consideration of concerns by the parties who were not signatories to the League of Nations. The new world court, the International Court of
Justice was, thus, formed in 1945. See Statute of the International Court of Justice,5june 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055,
.
See Factory at Chorzow (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. ~er. A) No. 6, at
28 .Guly 2:;:) (Merits): ("The rules of law governing the reparat10n are the rules
of mtertiat10nallaw m force between the two States concerned, and not the law
governin~ relations between the State which has committed a wrongful act and
the individual who has suffered damage.").
52
The Permanent Court of International Justice recognized that:
It is an elementary l'rinciple of international law that a State is
entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary
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Private suits in domestic courts were also not an option.
Many states had laws that limited grounds on which they could
be sued in their own courts which meant that foreign investors
54
had little recourse to that domestic legal system. Even if a private actor wanted to bring a suit in his own home court against
the foreign state, most developed states had laws that provided ·
55
foreign sovereign immunity. Moreover, private actors had no
international recourse in the case of a violation by their own government.
Today, under a treaty with no standing for private actors, private actors are involved only to the extent that they lobby their
governments to represent their interests and to protect their industries. Examples of this would be the United States negotiating

to international law committed by another State, from whom
they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case qf one of its subjects
and l:iy resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
P.roceecl!ngs. on his bel:ialf, ~ State is in reality asse':l:ing 1ts own
nghts-lts r1ght to ensure, m the person of Its subjects, respect
for the rules of international law:
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 13 (Aug.
30) ~urisdiction).
3

See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (involving U.S. government reliisal to espouse the claims of the plaintiff against the government of
Saudi Arabia). Individuals have traditionally been able to request that their
government espouse their claims before the ICJ or other international court.
See Lotus, (Fr. v. Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (SeJ>t. l);see also David M.
Reilly & Sarita Ordonez, Effect of the Jurisprudence of the !nternational Court
of Justice on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. lNT'L L. & POL. 435 (1996)
(analyzing U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan and the denial of individuals to bring a case in front of the ICD.
· ·
54
In most countries the ~overnment had full sovereign immunity both in
law and in practice. See Loms L. Jaffe, Suits A¥finst Government an4 Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1963); see also United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196 (1882) (stating that the United States may only be sued by its own
consent).
55
See, e.g., Forei~n Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1604
(1994) ("Subject to eXISting international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of the enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States except as provided
[in the exceptions]."); State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33 (Eng.) (granting immunity in the UnitedKmgdom to the sovereign).
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56

or negotiating with
·

Petition Domestically for Government to Represent

A second option is that private actors have the right to petition their governments to bring a dispute to the system. While
private actors do not have the opportunity to directly bring their
cases, the government may be persuaded through formal mechanisms that a dispute is sufficiently serious to warrant their attention. The closest example of this in the United States is the socalled "301 procedure" for the United States Trade Representative
("USTR"). 5 While the state still makes the final decision about
whether or not to bring such a case, there are formal mechanisms
for private actors to become involved at the domestic level in this
dispute resolution system. 59 Because the USTR's decisions have
56

See High Level Talks Slated with Japan on Auto Agreement, 14 Int'l Trade

Rep. (BNA) 1714 {Oct. 8, 1997).
57

See U.S., Russia Sign Cooperation Accords, Focus on Investment in Russia's
Regions, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1633 (Sept. 24, 1997).
58

Section 301 allows· an individual to petition the United States government to initiate trade dispute resolutions. Under Section 302 a party can petition the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate a foreign government's policies or practices that are suspected to be hindering trade. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 241214 (1994). The USTR, under section 304, must investigate and determine if the
fore1gn government has violated a trade agreement, benefits of any trade agreement are unreasonably being denied to the individual, or the foreign government is unjustifiably burdening or restricting U.S. commerce. See id. § 2414. If
the dispute involves a trade agreement the USTR is obligated under section
303{a)(2) to flrst use the dispute settlement procedures provided under that
agreement. See id. § 2413. For example, if a dispute involves infringements
based on one of the Uruguay Round Agreements, the USTR must utilize the
dispute resolution system of the World Trade Organization. If the USTR fmds
that a trade infringement is occurring and is convinced that the dispute should
involve action by the United States it will pursue resolution of the dispute.
The EU also has a procedure whereby private actors can request the EU take
action against those governments violatmg free trade agreements. See Council
Regulation 3286/94, 1994 O.J. {L 349) 71 [the Trade Barriers Regulation]
~aying down EU procedures in the Held of common commercial policy).
59
Out of the 23 section 301 cases initiated by an individual between 1985
and 1996, 11 GATT panels were established. See C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits

ofEconomic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organizations Dispute Set·
ilement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209 {1997). See also A. Lynne
Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Current Development, Rules, Sanctions and
Enforcement under Section 301; At Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 675
{1996) (detailing conflicts between Section 301 and WTO policy); Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution CYVer Unilateral Retaliation: Adju(f;cating the Use
ofSection 301 before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J.INT'LECON. L. 233 {1996).
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not been reviewed by the judiciary,60 a private actor seeking dispute resolution of his claim in this manner will likely have no recourse if the USTR decides to take no action.

3.2.3.

Individual Arbitration

Private actors can also be granted standing before an international arbitration board. Such a dispute resolution mechanism
permits standing for private actors directly affected by laws in the
state in which they are investing. The move toward investment
arbitration began with the creation of the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") under the aegis
61
of the World Bank. In the model of investment arbitration under ICSID, private actors can bring cases against states. ICSID has
jurisdiction over any legal dispute arising out of an investment between a member state and a national of another member state. 62
To initiate proceedings under ICSID, a party must submit a written request to the Secretary-General of ICSID detailing the issues
in dispute, the parties, and consent to arbitration. Once certified
by the Secretary-General of ICSID, a private actor can have the
case heard by an arbitral panel established by ICSID. 63 This
model of permitting private actors to bring cases against states has
The USTR has discretion in determining whether to initiate investi~a
tions from the petitions filed by interested individuals. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)
(2). If the USTR decides not to investigate, notice of such a determination with
an ex.P.lanation of reasons must be pul:ilished in the Federal Register. See id. §
2412(a) {3). But see Erwin Eichman & Gary Horlick, Political Questions in In·
tematlonal Trade: judicial Review ofSection 301, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L 735 (1989)
(~ing that a denial by the USTR to pursue investigations of an individual's
petttion should be reviewed by the judic•ary). . .
.
.
61
ICSID was established bythe Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signa·
ture Mar. 18, 19651 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. See also Thomas L. Brewer, International Investment Dispute
Settlement Procedures: The Res.ime for Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAW &
POL 'Y INT'L BUS. 633, 655-56 (1995).
62
See ICSID Convention, supra note 61, art. 25. The parties must, however, consent to the use of the arbitration facility. Id; The use of ICSID has
not been initiated by a Contracting State in complaint of an individual of another Contracting State even though the potential exists under the Convention
provisions. See David A. Solely, ICSID Implementation: An Effective Alternative
to International
Conflict, 19INT'LL. 521 {1985).
63
.
· See ICSID Convention, supra note 61, art. 36. Uuless the Secretarr.General fmds that the dispute falls outside the jurisdiction of ISCID, he will
register the request and notify the parties. See id. art. 36{3).
60
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since been copied in bilateral investment treaties in order to encourage foreign direct investment64 and outlined in the North
American Free Trade AJ~reement ("NAFTA") for investor disputes under Chapter 11.6 These treaties outline limited standing
provisions and permit only those private actors with investments
in the state to bring such a dispute against a state.
3.2. 4.

Private Actors Before a Court

The furthest evolution of individual standing is when private
actors have the ability to bring a case themselves to an international tribunal. 66 In the EU, private actors have the right to bring
64

See, e.g., Investment Treaty with the Republic of Armenia, Sept. 23,
1992, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-11, art. VI (1992).
65
See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289, ch. 20. [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA provides the opportunity under its
investment arbitration chapter to have arbitration under ICSID or Arbitration
Rules of the United Nations Conference on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") rules. Arbitration under ICSID rules is available to member
countries and nationa4 of member countries. Disputes where ouly one of the
countries concerned is a member of ICSID are earned out under the Additional
Facility Rules of ICSID. Because Canada and Mexico are not yet members of
ICSID, arbitration is only available under the Additional Facility Rules when
one of the countries involved is the United States. The first two NAFTA cases
using the ICSID Additional Facility Rules were registered in January and
March, 1997,' and involve U.S. nationals versus the Mexican government. See
Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (ICSID Case No. ARII (AF)/97/1); Robert Azinian
v. Mexico (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/2). See generally First ICSID Additional Facility Proceedings Under the NAFTA, 14 NEWS FROM ICSID, 1, 6, 10
(1997) (No. 1). Arbitrations involving only Canada and Mexico must be resolved using the UNCITRAL rules as the ICSID facility is not available where
neither country is a member.. UNCITRAL rules are reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701
(1976). A model similar. to il!vestor arbitration is also established in the Environmental .Side Accord to NAFTA, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, entered into fo"'e Jan. 1, 1994, art. 14(1), 32 I.L.M.
1480. For further information on tlie implementation of the Environmental
Accord see David Lopez, Dispute Resolution under NAFTA: Lessons from the
Early Experience 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163, 184-191 (1997); Kal Raustiala, International "Enforcement of Enforcement" Under the North American Agreement on
r;:oop_eration, 36 .VA./. INT'L L. 721 (1996); Rex J. Ze<Wis,
. Clazms by Indzviduals m Internatzona Econorrizc Law: NAFI'A Deve[opments, 7
Env_ironmenta~

AM. REv. INT'LARB. 115 (1996).
66
The first court to provide standing for· individuals was the Central
American Court of Justice created in ·1907 ·by Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Although the court's existence was short lived,
it was the first court to allow individual claims to be brought against the contracting states. Individuals were barred from bringing suit agrunst their own
nation and were required to demonstrate an exhaustiOn of local remedies before
bringing an action before the court. All of the five cases brought by individuals
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a case directly to the ECJ in certain circumstances.
Cases
brought before the ECJ based on a reference made by a domestic
.
.
court are more common. 68 Th·e pnvate
actor b nngs
a case to his
or her national court. That court then can refer the question of
EU law to the ECJ. In either case, the result is the opportunity
for private actors to ar~me and defend their rights in front of an
international tribunal. 69 El Mercado Comun del Sur
against a contracting state within the ten year existence of the Central American Court resulted m favor of the contracting states. See P.K. Menon, The In-

ternational Personality of Individuals in International Law: A Broadening of the
Traditional Doctrine, 1 J, TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 151, 159 (1992) (citing Convention for the Establishment of Central American Court of Justice, Dec. 20,
1907, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (Supp. 1908)).
67
Article 173 of the EC Treaty provides an individual with the opportunity to institute l?roceedings not only involving decisions·explicitly against that
person, but also mvolving any directive or regUlation that is of direct .and individual concern to that individual. The courts, however, have been reluctant to
allow all directives and regulations to be challenged. Compare Joined Cases 16
& 17/62, Confederation Nationale des Productents de Fruits et Legumes v.
Council1962 E.C.R. 47 (denyr,:· standing to fruit and vegetable producers petitionin~ to annul a Council re ation advancing a common market in the in·
dustry with Case 730/79, Phi •p Morris Holland v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R.
2671 ermitting standing for a cigarette manufacturer seeking to annul the
Commission's denial of permission to Holland for the.granting of state aid for
the expansion of cigarette production). For more information. on the application of Article 173, see Anthony Arnull, Private Applicants and the Action for
Annulment under Article 173 oj the EC Treaty, 32 COMMON MK.T. L. REV. 7
(199~.
.
.
6
• A~icle 177 of the EC Treatyf~ov:id~ guidance :o.the do'!'~ticcourt;s in
refernng ISSUes to the ECJ. The EC 1S hnilted to prov1ding prel!ffi!nary ruhngs
only on issues regarding the interpretation of the Treaty, the validity and interpretation of acts of the Community's institutions, and the interpretations of
any statutes that provide for such a means of clarification. See H.P. Bulmer Ltd.
v. J. Bollinger S.A., [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 91 (1974) (U.K.) (holding that English
judJ>es are the final court to apply commumty law, but the ultimate authority
on mterpreting community law goes to the ECD; Case 283/81, Sri CILFIT v.
Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415 (ruling that a national court is required to
refer cases where there is no judicial remedy in the member. state but there is a
question of Community law raised). The use of Artick 177 mitigates the strin. gent standing requirement set forth by Article 173. Thus, an individual who
does not have a direct and ~divi_dual concer':' to introduce a case· directly t? the
ECJ can commence the act1on m a domestic court and request a prehmmary
rulmg from the Eq. See Amull, supra, note 61, at 40-9 (describin~ the combined effect of Article 173 and 177); see also Schaefer, supra, note 27 (discussing
rights and remedies to brin~ claims under international dispute settlement sys· · .
tems and in domestic courts).
69
.
. Case law in the EU has also determined that an individual may sue other
individuals in orde.r to pro~ct his rights '!n~er Community law.. The concept is
referred to as honzontal direct effect (dist1rict from vert1cal direct effect, the
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("MERCOSUR", or the "Common Market of the South") also
modeled its system of dispute resolution upon the EU where private actors can go to either the MERCOSUR court or their na. al court.70
t10n
We cannot underestimate the impact of individual involve1
ment in international dispute resolution? Private actors play the
72
important function of private enforcement agents. · As such, private actors can themselves ensure that the law is being followed
rather than relying on states or an oversight body (such as the
Commission in the case of the EU) to bring a case. States may
feel reluctant to bring cases against other states for somewhat minor infractions as the diplomatic ramifications may not be worth
the trouble. Furthermore, it may be in many states' interests not
to follow the letter of the law exactly or to take their time in

litigation between an individual and a government entity). Horizontal direct
effect conclusively exists in issues involving conflicts arismg from articles and
regulations of the Community. See Defrenne, 1976 E.C.R. 455. However, the
question of horizontal effect m confl_ic!S ar~ing over directives has not been as
favorable. · See Case 91/92, Faccm1-Don v. Recreb, 1994 E.C.R. 3325
(confirming the traditional view that horizontal direct effect does not exist in
ilisputes involving directives rather than followins the Advocate General's advice to further die scope of direct effect). If the mdividual is denied access to
the ECJ to sue another individual, he may still have an opportunity to com:
mence an action against the Member State for noncompliance with Community law by not properly implementing the specific directive. See Case C106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA,
[1992]1 C.M.L.R. 305 (1992) (Spain) (emphasizing that the States have a duty to
implement directives in a manner so as to achieve the intended result of the
Community as closely as possible).
70
See MERCOSUR: Protocol of Brasilia for the Settlement of Disputes,
Dec. 17, 1991, repr!nted in36 LL.M. 691; Cherie O'Neal Taylor,Dispute Resolu-

tion as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an Agent for Deepening Integration: NAFTA andMERCOSUR?, 17 NW. J.INT'LL. & Bus. 850 (1996-97).

71 For a review of the most recent literature assessing the impact of individual litigants and EU law, see Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter,Revisiting the Eurqpean Court ofjustice, 52INT'L ORG. 177 (1998).
n See Weiler, supra note 3, at 2421 (notin~ im~ortance of citizens to the
EU judicial system); P.P. Craig, supra note 46 (1992 (arguing that private enforcement agents are critical to the EU system of ·rect effect). See generally
Dinah Shelton, 1be Participation of Nongover>Jmental Organizations in International judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994) (calling for greater acceptance of nongovernmental organizations acting as amici curiae by international courts).
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complying with the numerous laws set out under the EU-a kind
of willing collusion to ignore the law. 73
While an oversight body is more likely to bring cases, it also
has the problem of measuring the value of a vast number of cases
and keeping straightening out its own political agenda. In addition, an oversight body probably will not have sufficient resources to check compliance with all laws nor to bring all the
cases of noncompliance to the court. Private actors, on the other
hand, do not have the political baggage of bringing a case against
another state. Private actors can make a direct economic assessment about whether it is worth it to them to spend the time and
money on litigation. Where private actors are granted rights and
where the benefits of the treaty are supposed to accrue directly ·to
private actors, it makes sense to give private actors a remedy for
. Ianon
. of t hose ng
. hts. 74
vw

3.3.
3.3.1.

Supremacy over Domestic Law
Definition

A crucial factor in examining the rights of private actors is the
extent to which the system creates binding law for the member
states. Supremacy can be clearly defined for international law-be
it treaty or decision from the dispute resolution tribunal-to be
supreme to domestic law. Yet states vary widely on their use,
adoption, and interpretation of international law.
73

See Carlos A. Ball, The Making of a Transnational Cap.italist Society: The
Court of Justice, Social Policy, and billividual Rights Under the European Com·
munities Legal Order, 37 HARv. INT'LL.J. 307 (1996).
.
.

74
This avenue provided the court with the ol'portunity to decide some of
the most important cases in the judicial history of the ECJ. Furthermore, the
ECJ hears more cases as preliminary references under ArtiCle 177 than directly.
In the early years of the EEC, from 1958 to 1973, nearly two-thirds of all cases
in front of tl1e ECJ carne through J?reliminary rulings. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld,
Legal S'lstems of Regional EconomiC lntegratwn,. 22 AM. J. COMP. L. 415, 426
(1974) tciting to Commission's Annual General Report on the Activities of the
Communities). This use of Article 177 references continues to increase. In
1993, the ECJ received 203 references which more than doubled the number of
cases in 1980. See Sarah E. Strasser, Evolution & Effort: The Development of a
Strategy ofDocket Control for the European Court ofJustice & the Question ofPre.
liminary References (Harvard Law School Harvarcf jean Monnet Chair Working
Pa_P,ers, No. 3/95), available at ;,onathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet Chair
(v•sited Apr. 4, 1998) <http:/ www.law.harvard.edu/Prograrns/Jean Mon-

~>.

.

.
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Treaties Equal with National Law

Some states, including the United States, treat international
treaties as equal to national law. For example, the U.S. Constitu75
tion states that treaties are the supreme law of the land. Under
rules of interpretation, this means that a later law trumps the law
76
which preceded it. The Supreme Court has thus stated that,
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing,
and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation ....
When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will
always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to
both, if that can be done without violating the language of
either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date
will control the other, provided always the stipulation of
the treaty on the subject is self-executing. 77
In practice, a national law could overrule an international treaty
78
under this treatment of internatioylllaw, but it still places international treaties above state law.
75

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. {"This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land ... .") This interpretation of treaties is similar to the
one in the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries in which
courts have found international treaties to be equal to national law. In these
countries, ho~ever,, separate implementing legislation b~yond . ratification is
needed to provide direct ·effect under these treaties. In reality, this has been the
.

case in the United States in _more recent treaty implementation where treaties

:u-e no~ gi-:en direct ~ffect.unless express!y provided for in separate implementmg legislation. See discussion supra Sect10n 3.1.
·
76
. See C.H. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States,
42 MJNN.. L. REv. 709, 751 (1958) ("[T]he courts have consistently held that
treaties and statutes are mentioned in terms of equal dignity in the supremacy
clause, and therefore in the event of a conflict between them whichever is later
in time must prevail."). q: United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F.
Supp. 1456 (S:D.N.Y.. 1988) (holding that a subsequent statute would only supersede a treaty if that were the explicit purpose of the statute).
77
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 {1888).
78
See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. lNT'L L. 479 {1990)
(an~g GATT).
The Supreme Court has declared that legislation enacted by the .federal
government in order to implement the objectives of a treaty agreement will be
superior to any legislation enacted by the states. See Missouri v. Holland, 252
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Treaties Supreme to National Law

Another approach to international law is that it is supreme to
domestic law. Therefore, no national law, no matter when it is
passed, ever trumps an international law. Examples of countries
that follow this approach include Belgium, France, and Holland. 80
A modification of this approach. is that international law is supreme to all law except for the constitution or basic law of the
state, as is the case in Germany and Italy. 81
3.3.4.

Difference Between International Treaties and
International Decisions

As the U.S. Constitution discusses only those treaties concluded under Article II procedures, 82 it is left to the judiciary unU.S. 416 {1920) (holding that a treaty with Canada rei(Uiating the hunting of
migratory birdS IS constitutional and any federal legisTation therein will preempt state law). The Supreme Court furthered this notion by statin~ that a
self-executing treao/ will preempt state law, even with no federal legislation. See
United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979) {reaffirming the
superiority of treaties to state law governing Natiye American fishing rights).
For more information on state law preemption see generally, Harola Maier,
Preemption of State Law: A Reconim'ended Analysis, 83 AM. J. lNT'L L. 832
{1989).
80

.

.

In Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, the constituti~n or courts have

accorded self-executing treaties supremacY over prior or subseqUent _domestic
l!f;;islation. See CONST. art. 55 (Fr.); STATUUT NED. [Constitution], art. 94

(Neth.).
··
81
Article 25 of the Basic Law of Germany seeins to grant both direct effect
and sul'reinacy_to international law: "The general rules of public international
law.sha!l be an mteual part of the federal law. They shall.take precedence over
the laws and shall directly create rightS and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory." GRUNDGESETZ [<:;onstitution] [GG], art. 25: In practice, the
German Constitutional Court lias retained its ability to review mternational
law, including legislation of the EU and rulings of the ECJ, to ensure its compliance with the Basic Law of Germanr (the German Constitution). See
BVerfGE 89, 155 {the Maastricht Decision); :lriternationale Handelsgesefischaft
mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel {"Solange I"),
BVerfGE 37, 271, translated in [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540; In re Wunsche Handelsgesellschaft ("Solange II"), BVerfGE 73, 339, translated in [1987] 3 C.M.L.R.
225; Dieter Gnmm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The

German Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision, 3 CoLUM

J.

EUR. L. 229 {1997). Both Germany and Italy required separate constitutional
provisions to accept the supremacy of EU law. See Mattli & Slaughter, supra
note 71, at 203.
82
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur ....").
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der U.S.law whether decisions of international tribunals are to be
treated the same way. This problem exists in other states as well.
Even those states that find international treaties supreme to their
national law have not necessarily treated international decisions
the same way. While national constitutions may have envisioned
international treaties and made provisions for their supremacy,
few constitutions make provisions for decisions of international
tribunals. This can be attributed to two reasons. First, when
most state's drafted their constitutions, international decisionmaking bodies did not exist. Second, in the case of arbitration decisions, the arbitrator generally provides for damages and not a
change in the domestic laws. 83 The issue of supremacy does not
really arise because there is no new law created. Therefore, we
must examine what provisions the international trade treaty has
made regarding supremacy and how the member states have interpreted and acted upon this treaty. Only the EU has evolved to
the point
where ECJ
decisions are supreme
over national law in
.
. 84 .
.
all the member states;
3.3.5.

National judges' Ability to Overrule National Law

One last factor in determining the extent to which international tribunal decisions have supremacy is whether or not domestic judges have the power to enact this international law. Can
the domestic judge overrule national law in the face of a conflicting international decision? In some states, only the highest court
of the land can overrule a law. For instance, the Italian court system permits only the Italian Constitutional Court to address the
85
constitutionality of national legislation. Therefore, lower court
" Neither the IGSID or UNCITRAL rules exj>licitly deny the J>anel the
ability to proscribe a change in the law. However, the arbitrai.panels have not
diverged from the issuance of monetary damages as an award. See, e:lk• Ameri·
can Mfg. & Trading Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ARB/93/1;Southem PacifiC Proper·
ties Ltd. v. Arab Republic ofEgypt, ARB/84/3).
.
84
See J.H.H; Weiler & Ulrich Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community
Legal Ortfer-Througb the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411 (1996)
(commenting on the well-established supremacy doctrine of the ECJ and its
limitations); see also Symposium, The Interaction Between National Courts and
International Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J.INT'LL. & PoL'Y (1995-96}.
85
This system has only been modified regarding EU law, where it was held
that if the lower Italian courts are not permitted to rule on the invalidity of an
inconsistent statute, the integration of Community law in the Member States is
significantly hindered,. For the progression of Community law in Italy, see
Costa, 1964 E.C.R. 585; Amministrazione Delle Finanze Delio Stato, 1978
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judges are constrained by their national rules in the implementation of international rules. Similarly, in France and Great Britain,
the tradition of judicial review did not exist and took more time
to implement in light of EU law. 86 For true supremacy of international law, all judges at all levels need the ability to evaluate national law in the face of conflicting international law.
3.4.

Transparency

3.4.1. Why Transparency is Important

Transparency in a dispute resolution system refers to the clarity and intelligibility of the procedures of the system as well as to
the outcomes. The level of transparency is important for a number of reasons, which could be called the three P's: publicity,
precedent and predictability. First, when the rules and procedures are clear, parties to the dispute are more likely to use the
system. Government officials, as well as lawyers for individual
clients, will have some comfort level with the dispute resolution
system and will have an awareness of how the system works. 87
Second, published decisions of dispute resolution tribunals provide lessons and possible persuasive authority for other dispute
resolution tribunals such as courts or arbitrations. If a decision is
published, it can provide persuasive precedent for similar disputes. 88 Publicity of decisions also puts pressure on states to
E.C.R. 629 (holding that Italian National Court must give full effect to Community law provisions). See generally Marta Cartabia, The Italian Constitutional

Court and the Relationship Between the Italian Legal System and the European
Community, 12M!CH. J. INT'LL. 173 (1990) (discussing contradictions between
EU Court rulings and Italian )aw); Antonio La Pergola,Italy and European In·
tegratwn: A Lawyer's Perspectwe, 4 IND. INT'L &; CoMP. L. REv. 259 (1994)
(detailing growing support for EU integration in Italy and Italy's subsequent
attempt to cope with EU directives which conflict witli their nat10nallaw).
86
See, e.g., Mattli &; Slaughter, supra note 71, at 200-04 (1998).
87
This concern with transparency and legitimacy has·also manifested itself
in the EU. See Lole, supra note 15; Maher, supra note 15, 238-40; Weiler, su·
pra note 3, at 2421 noting importance in the EU judicial system for citizens to
act as a decentraliz agent for monitoring compliance).
88
See, e.g., U~ted Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18);
North Seas Contmental Shelf (F.RG. v. Den.; F.RG. v. Netli.), 1969 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 20). For a further discuss10n on precedent in dispute resolution, see}OHN
H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND PoUCY OF IN.
TERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS
(1989);
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN,
STRENGTHENING THE GATT DISPUTE SETILEMENT SYSTEM (1988);
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89

comply with the rulings.
Finally, transparent rules and decisions increase the predictability of the system. Clear rules set
forth how the system is going to work and create confidence on
90
the part of the users of the system. The transparency of the system provides the opportunity for both practitioners and academics to analyze, improve, and comprehend this particular international dispute resolution system. Equally importantly, wellreasoned decisions create confidence in the dispute resolution
body and educate the users of the system about how the body
would be likely to rule in the future.
Even if a user of the system is not happy with the particular
outcome, predictability allows the parties to decide whether or
not to use this particular route of dispute resolution. When systems are not predicable, both government officials and private
lawyers will be reluctant to advise governments and private actors
to take a chance on a haphazard outcome. The clearest example
of this has been ICSID, where the small number of cases over the
years and the unpredictability in terms of appeals has led many
government and corporate lawr;ers to advise their clients against
this route of dispute resolution. 1
· .
MOHAMMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT (1996);
Yong K. Kim,. The Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the International Trade System Despite U.S. Constitutiona!Constraints, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L 967 (1996).
89
See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPUANCE WITH lNTE!U'O\.TIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS 22 (1995).
.
.
.
· "' See Yair Baranes,. The Motivations and the Models: A Comparison of the Israel-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 17
N.Y.L. SCH. J- INT'L & COMP. L 145, 156 (1997) (arguing that the lack of
specificity in the Israel-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is-problematic).
91
T\>e ptoble~. with IC~ID is only partially a result of the lack of transparency m the decisions. In Its 32 year hiStory, ICSID has only handled about
45 cases. ICSID lacks the history and case load to _provide predictability and
assurance to investors in need of an efficient and effective arbitration· facility.
Another l'roblem with ICSID is that the decision is subject to review by an internal revtew-committee. Any_party may req_uest an interpretation, revision, or
annnlmeilt ·of an award. ·See ICSID Convention § 5; arts. 50-52, supra note 61.
The tribunal that rendered the award or, if unavailable or not practical, a new
review tribunal shall decide on the reviewable issue. Revisions of an award mal'
be l'rovided if new information is discovered within three years of the rendereil
deciSions. See id., art. 51. Article 52 lists five reasonswhy an award may be annulled: (1) the_ tribunal was not properly consti!uted, (2) the tribunaL manifestly exceeded Its powers, (3) a member of the tnbunal was corrupted, (4) the
tribunal seriously departed from the fundamental rule of procedure, and (5) the
award fails to state tlie reasons on which it was based. See id, art. 52. Although
whether a decision is subject to review is not· a factor used to determine ihe
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Lack ofRules and Procedure

The lowest level of transparency is when the rules and procedure do not exist in advance of the dispute .. Resolution is left up
to the parties and no system is set forth. This is most typical in
bilateral treaties, where disputes in compliance or intei'J'.retation
of the treaty are left to the states to negotiate as they arise. 92 ·

3.4.3.

Decisions/Agreements Not Published

When the rules and procedures are clear but the decisions of
the tribunal or the agreement between the parties are not published, this creates an additional transparency issue. For example,
an ICSID. arbitration decision can also be kept confidential if requested by the parties. 93 This means that this decision cannot
provide precedent or predictability in the system because uninvolved lawyers cannot analyze the panel's thinking. 94 In this case,
type of dispute resolution .S}'stem, it clearly affects the overall effectiveness of
any system. In addition to further time and expense associated with the decision, in ICSID's case, it further diminished the predictability o.f the dispute
resolution system. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
TOWARD "JUDIC!AUZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? (Richard Lillich & Charles
Brower eds.) (1992); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND
REPAIR 46-106 (1992); Thomas L. Brewer,lntemational Investment Dispute Set·
tlement Procedures: 1be Evolving Regime for Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAW.
& PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 633 (1995); David A. Soley, ICSID Implementation: An Ef
fectiveAltemative to International Conflict, 19INT'LLAW 521 (1985).
92
See example of the renegotiation of the U.S.·Japanese auto agreement
.
discussed infra note 99.
93
Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention explicitly prohibits the publish·
ing of awards without the consent of the parties. See ICSID Convention, supra
note 61, art. 48(5). Thus, ~he transparency of such a system rem~s. questionable. See John B. Attanasto, Rapporteur's Overvzew and Concluswns Of Saver·
eignty, Globalization, and Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL (1996)
(aadressing the factors that make the ICSID less credible than ICJ judgments).
See also J .A. Freedberg, The Role of tbe International Council for Commercial A r·
bitration in Providing Source Material in International Commercial Arbitration,
23 INT'L J. LEGAL INFo. 272 (1995) (stating that even thoultit the ICSID Con·
vention requires consent to publish, many awards get publislied).
94
The ICSID's lack of case law precedent. as well as the review process
make the arbitral facility less appealing to investors. Difficulty with. interfer·
ence by national courts has made ICSID even more unreliable. See Maritime
Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Rel'ublic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (ICSID, Case No. ARB/84/4) (refusing to enforce the ICSrb arbitral
awaid); Monroe Leigh,]udicial Deciswns, 81 AM. J.INT'LL. 206, 222-25 (1987).
(detailffig AMCO Asia Corp. v. Republic of IndOnesia, 25 LL.M. 1439, ICSID
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parties are able to understand how the system works, but are not
confident using it. Outsiders either have no idea about the outcome of the dispute, or, when they do, the lack of an explanation
for the decision still leaves gaps in their understanding of how the
tribunal works. In addition, a body of case law with persuasive
force is not established, and the rules of the organization remain
to be interpreted on an ad hoc basis.
3.4.4.

Decisions Are Published

The highest level of transparency is when the decisions of the
dispute resolution body are published regularly. In this case, the
decisions can be read b§; practitioners, government officials, other
5
jurists, and academics.
Decisions can b~ analyzed, explained,
and used as a basis for other cases. Only in this way can persuasive authority be established. This is also the best way for private
actors and their lawyers to become comfortable with the dispute
resolution mechanism. Furthermore, public decisions increase
the pressure on states to comply. This level of transparency currently exists only in the EU although the WTO has made progress towards this goal.
3.5.

Compliance/Enforcement

The fifth and final factor in determining the value of individual involvement is the level of enforcement mechanisms provided
for in the dispute resolution system. Compliance and enforcement are often targeted as the main weakness of the international
legal system. 96 Because international courts have thus far not had
(Case No. ARB/81/1) (1986), where the Indonesian government annulled
ICSID decision on the groundS that ICSID "manifestly exceeded its powers.").
95
See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Di!Pute Settlement System of the World

Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT D~te Settlement System
Since 1948, 31 COMMON.MK.T. L. REV. 1157, 1227 (1994) (explaining the neces-

sity of publishing decisions in a timely manner).
96
John Austin, for example, called internationallaw"public international
morality" at best because he defined law to reqnire the thieat of enforcement,
while international law is merely enforced by moral obligation rather than direct subjection to a nation's laws. See John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or
the Philosophv ofPositive Law (New York, Jane Cockcroft & Co., 1875), vol. 1,
p. 121; see afso LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN
POliCY (2d ed. 1979) (discussin~the effects of international law on how nations
behave among one another); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE (4th ed. 1949)
(discussing origins and peculiarities of international law).
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military forces to enforce their decisions, many critics of the international system focus on those cases where states choose to ignore the international court. 97 The apparent uselessness of the
United States bringing a case against Iran for holding U.S. hostages and the attempt of the United States to avoid prosecution by
Nicaragua are often cited as classic examples of what happens before an international court. Similarly, the breakdown of GATT
in the 1980's as the most powerful states ignored GATT panel
98
recommendations shows the weakness of relying on states to
comply without effective enforcement measures. Without arguing whether international dispute resolution can ever truly
"work," it is important to assess the level of enforcement a court
can have.
3.5.1.

No Formal Enforcement of the Treaty Rights

The first level of enforcement of treaties is where there is
nothing specific written into the treaty or dispute resolution system. Enforcement under this system of dispute resolution is
clearly left to the respective states. There is no oversight institution. Any noncompliance would put the parties back at the negotiation table in order to work out this dispute as well. In other
words, a negotiation system which relies on first-order compli-

97

Louis Henkin says •almost all nations observe almost all principles of in·
ternational law and almost all of their obligations almost all of £he time."
HENKIN, supra note 96, at 47. But, skeptics point to plenty of contrary evidence such as the Iran-United States or United States-Nicaragua cases before the
ICJ. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (U.S. v. Iran)
1981 I.C.J. 45 (May 12); Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nic. v. U.S.) 1986
I.C.~. 14 Gune 27).
8
GATT procedure provided the losing parties with successful means of
delaying the appointments of panels, effectively blocking adoption of the panel
reports, and merely ignoring l'anel decisions. For instance, after the U.S. asserted a complaint in 1981 unoer GATT against the EC concerning pasta export subsidies, the EC effectively blocked adoption of the panel report in favor
of the United States. The United States resorted to indirect retahation efforts
which sparked countermeasures by the EC. See ROBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 151-54 (1993) (citing Subsidies on Exports of
Pasta Products, SCM/43, May 19, 1983, an unadopted decision, and other cases
detailing GATT's ineffectiveness); see also Petersmann, supra note 95, at 1203.04
(enumerating some further problem areas of the GATT dispute settlement system).
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ance requires following the agreement at all times. States either
99
follow the agreement, or they must negotiate a new one.

3.5.2.

Second.Order Compliance-Remedies for Ignoring the
Treaty

Second-order compliance occurs when a dispute resolution
mechanism exists under the treaty which would rule on compliance. by the member states. Without a separate mechanism, rules
for treaty compliance and breach follow the default rules of the
Vieima Convention. 100 The rules of the Vienna Convention,
however, are generally gerceived as insufficient in terms of dealing with treaty breach,' 1 and therefore create an incentive for in" For example, Japan and the U.S. have had to renegotiate their agreement
on the au_to parts market several times. See U.S. Frustratea by Japan's Progress on
C.r Sales, Dealerships in Auto Talks, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1759 (Oct. 9,
1997); High Level Talks Slated with Japan onAuto Agreement, supra note 56;
Dav1d Sanger, Trade's Bottom Lone: Busmess over PolitiCs, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
1995, at D5.
100
See Vienr.a Convention on the Laws of Treaties, opened for signat~re
May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Con£. 39/27 [hereinafter V1enna Convention].
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention specificallr address issues of treaty
interpretation. According to Article 31f a treaty shal be interpreted first by
looking at the text of the treaty itself in ight of the object and pu'l'ose. Methods for interpretation shall then recognize the entire treaty taking mto consideration subsequent treaties and practices. The negotiation history of the treaty
will also be taken into consideration. If the treaty remains ambiguous after
those considerations, Article 32 allows for recognition of the preparatory
works for the final method of interpretation. Subsequent articles deal with the
conditions under which a party may terminate its oliligations under the treaty.
For instance, Article 46 inValidates a treaty if it violates an international law of
fundamental principle; Articles 49 through 52 deal with the termination of obligations when a treaty was jlrocured tlirough fraud1 corruption, or coercion;
Article 61 discharges a party for impossibilitf of pertormance; and, Article 62,
rebus sic stantibUs,-· allows for termmation o a treaty in which a circumstance

that was an essential basis for consent fundamentally changes to the extent of
radically transforming the scope of obligation. As a last resort, a !'artY to a
treaty may. terminate its obligation by breach but must confront the consequences addressed by Article 60.
101
See Frede~ic Kirg_is, Jr., Some Lin~;ering Questions about Article 60 of the
Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treatzes, 22, CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 549 (1989)
(discussing the unresolved issues of breach); John K. Setear,Responses to Breach

of a Treaty and Rationalist International Refations Theory: The Rules of Release
and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsihilit:y, 83
VA. L. REV. 1 (1997) (explaining that, in addition to Article 60, remedies for
breach of a treaty exist m the form of an uncodified law}; see also SHABTAI

ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATY (1985) (generalizing breaches of treaties). Article 60 of the Vienna Convention delineates the consequences for breach of a
treaty. In the instance of a material breach involving a bilateral treaty, the ter-
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ternational organizations to set up more complete mechanisms of
dispute resolution.
.
Any of the formal mechanisms discussed here-including arbitration under ICSID, panels under GATT, the dispute resolution
system under the WTO, and cases under the ECJ-act as secondorder compliance mechanisms. They permit cases to be brought
for noncompliance with the treaty rules. Both GATT and the
ICJ are examples of court systems that provide for little realistic
r
·
beyond censure
·
· of t h e mternatlon
·
· al comtnumty.
· 102
emorcement
These systems stop at second-order compliance, whereby states
should obey the law, but if they violate the law, they should pay a
fine (or change the law).
One important factor to note at this stage is how and when
cases are brought to the dispute resolution system. For example,
in the EU, the Commission acts as an oversight body and can
mination or suspension of obligations may be instituted by the nonbreaching
party. With a multilateral treaty, all nonbreaching parties must consent to the
termination or suspension of tlie treaty in whole or in part. Specifically, the
affected !'artY may suspend its obligatwns with the breaching party, or if the
material breach radically changes the scope of the treaty any nonbreaching
P.artY may inyoke suspension or termination .of the treaty. See Vienna Convenuon, supra note 100, art. 60. .
.
_
102
•
·Although GATT provided for retaliation and the ICJ provides for en·
forcement under the Security Council, neither of these remedies were real possibilities for enforcement. The Security Council has never ajl~horiied militaty
actio·n nor economic sanctions for noncompliance with .an ICT. decision. See
Mark Janis, Somber Reflections on the c_ompulsory Jurisdiction of th_elnternational
Court, in Af'!',aisals of the IC]~ Decision: Nicaragua v.. United States (Merits}, 81
AM. J. !NT L L. 144, 145 n.l6-17 (Harold G. Maier ed., 1987) (statmg that al. though the U.N. Charter authorizes the Securi!')' Council to enforce oecisions
of the ICJ, no action has ever been taken). Retaltation authoriZed under GATT
was only used once by the Netherlands against the United States. See ROBERT
E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 198
(1990). However, the enforcement of decisions in international law through
voluntaty compliance in the face of international pressure should not be under- ·.
estimated. Many countries regularly abide by unfavorable rulings in order to
· remain a law abtding member of the international community. See CHAYES &
CHAYES, supra note 89, at 28. Furthermore, direct foreign atd, foreign investment, and World Bank projects are often linked to compliance under interna·
· tionallaw. For exrunple, the World Bank bas played a major role in the compliance of environmental laws in Mexico. See Mexico's Environmental
Controls for New Companies, 2 MEx. TRADE & L. REP. 15 (1992); David Bar-

rans, Promoting International Environmental Protections through Foreign Debt
. Exchange Transactions, 24 CORNELL !NT'L L.J. 65 (1991). But sei: Stephanie
Guyett, Environment and Lending: Lessons of the World Bank, Hope for the European Bank for Reconstruction and DeveloJl!nent, 24 N.Y.U. J. lNT'L L. & POL.
889 (1992) (criticiZing the shortcomings of such an enforcement mechanism).
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bring cases of noncompliance to the ECJ. 103 Other organizations
do not provide standing for any oversight body, meaning that
cases will be brought, if at all, by other states. Under GATT,
states could also delay or avoid a case. 104 Under the new WTO
procedures, the dispute resolution system has become much more
. di Cl"al"1zed•!OS
JU

3.5.3.

Third-Order Compliance-Remedies for Ignoring
Decisions
·

Third-order compliance can be demonstrated by way of a traffic law example. If we conceive that following the traffic laws is
first-order compliance and paying the traffic ticket when one does
not it is second-order comrliance, an arrest warrant or contempt
citation for nonpayment o the traffic ticket would be third-order
compliance. This is yet another level of forcing one to comply
with the original laws set forth. In the international arena, the
analogy would be following the trade treaty as complying in the
first-order, and agreeing to change the tariff in response to a determination that the tariff was unfair would be the second-order
103

Article 169 of the EEC Treaty gives the Commission the authority to
enforce community law compliance for all Member States. The Commission
will first give the State notice in the form of an opinion letter, detailing the
method and timeliness ofcompliance. If the Member State refuses to comply,
the Commission can st.ie the Member State in the ECJ. See Case 7/61, Com·
mission v. Italy, 1961 E.C.R. 317 (forcing Italy to terminate its ban on imported
pork in compliance with community law). See Karen Banks, National Enforce·
ment of Community Rights, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 669 (1984}. Article 170
gives a Member State the right to sue another Member State for the enforcement of community law. The complaining State must first submit its concern
with the Commission and allow the Commission to enforce the issue. See Case
232/78, Commission v. France, 1979 E.C.R. 2729 (describing Commission ac·
tion on complaints from the United Kingdom). Although a rare occurrence, if
specific measures are not taken the complainmg State can take the infringing
State directly to the ECJ. See, e.g., Case 141/78, France v. United Kingdom,
1979 E.C.R. 2923. For more on enforcement of these articles, see generallyEn·
forcementActiom under Articles 169and 170 EEC, 14 EUR. L. REv. 388 (1989).
104
See C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits ofEconomic Power: Section 301 and the
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
209, 236-37 {1997) (discussing the delays brought about by die United States
when Brazil pursued under GATT complaints about Section 301}; see also John
Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC C.Se in GATT, 72
AM. J. lNT'L L., 747,.779-81 (1978} (concluding that the some GATT dispute
cases, due to interference from other states, severely injure GATT's prestige).
105
See Petersmann, supra note 95; Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The
judicialization of International Trade Relations, 17Nw. J. lNT'LL. & Bus. 775
(1996-97).
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of compliance. The third-order of compliance would be a system
by which the affected state, private actor or even the international
organization would be able to bring noncompliance with the international decision back to the dispute resolution system.
In some situations, this third-order compliance mechanism is
available. For example, if an international arbitration body
awards a certain amount of money to a party that is then not
paid, many states now provide that the winner of the arbitral
award can bring a case in domestic court to enforce the judgment.106 Another example is the EU, which provides that a state
or the Commission can bring a case to the ECJ a~Wnst a member
state that has not complied with a court decision. 7 Enforcement
under the EU is even more likely because the decisions themselves
are integrated into the domestic legal fabric as is done with the referral system under the ECJ. 108 Because the ECJ makes the ruling
106

.

Signatories of the New York Convention permit individuals and na·

tions access to their courts in order to attach assets of nonpaying parties to an

arbitration. See Convention of the United NationS on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreij;n Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 30
U.N.T.S. 38. [heremafter New York Convention]; Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie Du Papier ("RAKTA"), 508
F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974) (enforcing an award on the basis of the New York
Convention). Article V of the New York Convention recognizes only seven
circumstances in which a signatory state may refuse enforcement and, thus, this

treaty has been credited wtth drastically strenj;thening the apl'eal of international arbitration. See Susan Choi,judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards
Under ICSID and the New York Convention, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 175
(1995); Eric Green, International Commercial ?ilute Resolution, 15 B.U. lNT'L
LJ. 175,177 (1997); Elise P. Wheeless, Article Vi'i) (!3) of the New York Conven·
tion, 7 EMORY lNT'L L. REV. 805 (1993). In a cfiuon to the New York Convention other treaties exist for the purpose of enforcement of arbitral awards
such as the Panama Convention, die Washington Convention, and the European Convention. See Inter~American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975, entered into force June 16, 1976, 14 I.L.M. 336; Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
ana Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 532; European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
•
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 229.
107
See, e·l:·• Case 169/87, Commission v. France, 1988 E.C.R. 4093 (forcing
the Commisswn to bring France in front of the ECJ for the second ume for
noncompliance with an earlier court rnling on tobacco pricing}; Case 48/71,
Commission v. Italy, 1972 E.C.R. 527 (allowing a claim against Italian government for failure to levy an EU tax}; Case 131784, Commission v. Italy 1985
E.C.R. 3531 (allowing action against Italy for failure to enforce the"Collective
Redundancies"); Case 69/86, Commission v. Italy, 1987 E.C.R. 773 (enforcing a
previous judgnient against Italy for the quality control of produce).
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on the law alone, the domestic court then renders the final decision applying the EU law to the facts at hand. Since the decision
is from a domestic court, not an international court, many commentators believe that states are far less likely to ignore the decisions.109 Each additional .order of compliance means that private
actors have increased ability to force states to comply with the
treaty.

3.5.4.

Punishment

A final component of enforcement is the type of punishment
permitted under the treaty and dispute resolution system. Retaliation apart from an international treaty is generally seen as a
violation of internationallaw. 110 Treaty-approved retaliation, on
the other hand, can provide an effective enforcement mechanism.
This approved ret,Uiation does .not constitute a breach or termination of the treaty but rather an appropriate means of punishment
for the treaty violation. The retaliation can be carried out by the
state against which the harm has been committed or even by
other states.
·
For example, the WTO outlines ·stringent enforcement meas. terms of prov1'd'mg a menu of enrorcement
£
.
111
ures m
optwns.
F or more 1morm~t1on
._,
. on t h'1S _process see A ttanasto,
. supra note 93, and
Lenore Jones, Opinions of the Court of the EU in National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J.
INT'LL. & POL. 275 {1996).
.
109 See generally Symposium, supra note 84, {portraying several views COJ;lcerning the problems ana inconsistencies between nattonru and international
bodies).
110
See }AGDISH BHAGWATI ET AL., AGGRESSIVE UNILATERAUSM {1990)
{describing various opinions on the debate over U.S. trade sanctions and the
GATT.); see also Clay Hawes, The Pe/ly Amendment Sanctions, 3 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 97 {1994) (debating whether sanctions imposed on Norwegian
~oods for violation of the Fisherman's Protective Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1994)
tS a violation of internationa! law); Myles Getlan, Comment, TRIPS and the Fu·
ture ofSection 301, 34 COLUM. J. TRANS. NAT'LL. 173 {1995) (eva!uating sane·
tions in the area of intellectua! property); Lopez,supra note 65 (discussing the
controversy of the Helms-Burton Act as a potentia! violation of NAFTA).
111
Under the WTO, if a party does not comply with a decision within the
specified time period, the party must start negotiations for mutua!ly accepted
compensation .. If no compensation is agreed upon aher twenty days, the com·
plainant, un~er ~ide 22, ?" request authonz~tion from the Dispu~e Settle·ment Body { DSB ) to retit11ate. The DSB cons1sts of one rel?resentat1ve from
each member of the agreement in dispute and has the authonty to administer
rules and procedures, ado.Pt reports from panels, maintain surveillance of im·
plementattOn, and authonze suspension of concessions. Unless there is a con·
sensus against reta!iation, the DSB must grant authorization within 30 days.
108
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First, a state has the opportunity to follow the ruling and, usually,
change the offending practice. Second, the state can continue the
112
practice and pay damages to the harmed state.
If neither of
113
these options are taken, the harmed state can retaliate.
The
WTO provides that the harmed state must first retaliate in the
same sector of trade. However, if this is not seen as effective, the
114
WTO permits cross-sector retaliation.
This newer form of the
international adjudication has more teeth then its predecessors
and attempts to correct some of the problems of the past. 115
Retaliation will ftrst be taken in the same sector as the violation. If, however,
such retaliation is not _practical or effective, action will be taken in another sector in the same general area. If this still proves ineffective or impractical, action
will be taken as a suspension of benefits u11der the related Uruguay Round
Agreement. The determination as to whether· retalicition ·is practical or effective
will be made by the complaining party rather than the WTO panel or the defending party. See Thomas J. Dillion, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A
New Legal Order for World Trade, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349 (1995) (discussing
the effectiveness of the WTO with a comparison of the lack of enforcement
under compliance mechanisms of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") or
the World Bank}; Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute Settle·
ment Report: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Rule Compliance, 11
ST.JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 307 (1996).
112
Under Article 21 of theDispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), if
the party does not, within thirty days, state intentions for implementing recommendations of the adopted panel report and set a time penod for compliance, the parties must commence negotiations for mutual!)' accepted compensation. See, e.g., John Maggs, US May Buck· Tide, Take on ihe WTO, J. COM. 1
(1998) (detailing that in the face of a recent WTO preliminary report that the
U.S. emban:o on shrimp imports, designed to protect sea turtles, was illegal,
speculation has begun that the United States woUld prefer to pay compensation
or accept sanctions rather than change the law).
Ill Article 22 of the DSU allows the complaining party to request authorization from the DSB to retaliate. The DSB must grant authorization within
thirtf. days unless there is a consensus against such retaliation.
14
·
Article 22 of the DSU permits cross-sector retaliation if the previous
retaliation, within the sector, is not deemed practical or effective. The determination of whether retaliation is "practical" or "effective" will be made by the
complaini~~g party, rather than the DSU. However, paragraph four limits the
retaltation a government can impose to the equivalent of benefits that the defending country was impairing. See also 19U.S.C. § 241l(a)(3) (1994) (imposing
the same limitations).
.
115
··
See Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana
Charter to the World Trade Ori!.anization, 34 GOLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123
{1995); Mary E. Footer, The Role of Consensus in GA TT!WTO Decision Making,
17
lNT'L L. & Bus. 653 (1997); Patrick Moore, The Decisions Bringing the
GATT 947 and the WTO Agreement, 90 AM. J. lNT'L L. 317 (1996); Curtis
Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J.
lNT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996).

Nw·}·

S

U. Pa. f. lnt'l Econ. L

624

[Vol19:2

Another type of enforcement is a fine levied against the member state for a violation of the treaty. This fine could be paid to
the international organization, the affected state or the private actor who is directly harmed. Under traditional international law,
once a state took up a private actor's claim of harm, the money to
be paid would go to the state. 116 A more recent innovation in international law is the idea that states can be directly liable to individuals for the harm they have suffered. This is the case under
EU!aw.
This type of punishment directly rectifies the harm caused by
the noncompliance with the international law and also puts a
price tag on noncompliance. The ECJ acts like a domestic court
117
since it awards damages directly to aggrieved private actors.
The power to award damages may alter a national government's
decision whether to comply with an international law since it
puts a price tag on noncompliance. The costs of noncompliance
can be severe and direct. 118 The EU has gone even further since
116

See RICHARD B. Lll.UCH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS 45 (1975). The problem arising with enforcing claims in this manner is a concern of timeliness. The
claims are only settled years after the harm was done and, thus, the settlement
is often not an effective resolution. See Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the HelmsBurton Act is Consistent with International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 434, 436, 440
n.15 (1996) (discussing the ineffectiveness of settlements in the 1980's between
the U.S. and China forless than 40% ofthe claim and in 1992 between the U.S.
and Germany for around 6% of the claim).
117
See Case 14/83, Von Colson & Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,
1984 E.C.R. 1891 (allowing individual workers to enforce their rights under a
Community Directive on equal employment); Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz
eG v. Landwirtschafts-Kammer Fiir Das Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989 (forcing
Germany officials to refund illegal money charged to individuals for the inspection of imported apples even tliough the German statute of frauds had run on
the claim). For more on this aspect of the ECJ's damages awards see David
O'Keefe, supra note 48, and April Phillippa Tasli,Remedies for European Community Law Claims in Member State Courts: Toward a European Standard, 31
COLVM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 377 (1993).
118
See Case C-271/91, Marshall v. Southampton and S.-W. Hampshire
Area Health Auth., 1993 E.C.R. I-4367 (imposing damages that exceeded the
United Kingdom's statutory limitations); Case G6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v.
Italy1 [1993]2 CM.L.R. 66 (1993) (Italy) (forcing Italy to compensate workers
for aamages suffered by nommplementation of a community directive dealing
with worker's protectiOn against bankrupt employers); Case 70/72 Commission v. Germany, 1973 E.C.R. 813 (forcing Germany to not only cease the illegal payments of state aid, but also, recover any aid already granted to its nation31s). Remarkably, the ECJ has not imposed any fine thus far in a case brought
by the Commission. Article 171 specifiCally states that the ECJ may, by therequest of the Commission, impose a lump sum or penalty payments upon a
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1991 and found that member states can be liable to private actors
for damages suffered through the nonimplementation of EU
119
laws.
And, in some ways, these fines make compliance in the
first place easier since a government can demonstrate how noncompliance will directly hurt the national treasury. A potentially
large damage award helps the governments protect themselves
against strong domestic lobbies as well.
These damage remedies in the EU are additional to a requirement to change the law, unlike in the WTO system which grants
choice. By replacing the traditional international law remedy of
retaliation, a damages system is closer to a domestic court system.
Violations of international law are treated like any other violation
of the law. By eliminating retaliation, the EU avoids escalation
between states retaliating and cross-retaliating. It also avoids linkage between different trade issues; each problem is treated separately and judged on its own merits. An enforcement system
with damages to private actors clearly protects private actors the
most of the trade systems established.
4. INCREASING INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION INCREASES
DEMOCRACY

The purpose of this Article has been to outline the factors that
measure individual participation in dispute resolution and comMember State that refuses compliance. This Article was added to the Treaty at
the request of Parliament concerned with the enforcement of Community law.
Article 171(1), stating that necessaty measures shall be taken for enforcement of
compliance, has been used by the ECJ. See Lisa Borgfeld White, Comment, The
Enforcement ofEU Law, 18 Hous. J. !NT'LL. 833, 898 n.207 (1996) ~isting the
fifteen cases in violation of Article 171). However, the imposition of a fine,
under Article 171(2), has yet to be employed. See Kennetli M. Lord, Note,
BootstTaPfJing an Environmental Policy from an Economic Convent, 29 CORNELL
!NT'L LJ. 571, 606 n.325 (1996) (commenting on the lack of enforcement
through use of fines). See also Michael J. McGuinness, The Protection of Labor
Rights in North America1 30 STAN. J. !NT'L L. 579, 596 n.81 (1994) (reasoning
the lack of enforcement by use of Article 171).
.
119
In 1991, the ECJ instituted remarkable advancement for the enforcement of Community law through the preliminaty reference ruling in Francovicb v. Italy. See Joined Cases 6/90 & 9/90, Francovich, [1990]1 C.M.L.R.
66 (1990); Rene Valladares, Francovicb: Lir,ht at the End of the Marsliall Tunnel, 3
U. MIAMi Y.B. !NT'L L. 1 (1;995). The ruline conferred hability UJ?On a Member
State to an individual for damages incurred by nonimplementauon of a directive. Thus, because Italy failed to implement a directive concerning the coverage of employees under insolvent employers, Italy was liable for the damages
the employees suffered. See Valladares, supra.
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pare them to the dispute resolution models currently used in international trade organizations. By doing so, we can understand
how each of these factors either adds or detracts from the legitimacy of international trade organizations. In the end, we can
recognize that individual participation has the ability to increase
democracy in several significant ways.

4.1.

judicial Decisionmaking is Lawmaking

The first step in recognizing the importance of individual participation is to recognize the importance itself of dispute resolution. Historically, states handled trade disputes through negotiation and little attention was given to other methods for resolving
them. Only with the evolution of the EU, and the regional human rights systems, has appro~riate focus been given to the importance of dispute resolution. 0
.
. In focusing on dispute resolution, we are recognizing the evolution of trade organizations that do more than rdy on states to
resolve their disputes. The creation of the Dispute Resolution
Body under the WTO and the NAFTA system evolving from the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement clearly demonstrate that focus on dispute resolution is warranted. As trade organizations
continue to evolve, it will be their dispute resolution systems that
herald this evolution.
The result of dispute resolution mechanisms is that each of the
organizations· will be creating a body of law in addition to the
original agreement. This body of law may have.varying levels of
precedence and supremacy but will be the area in which these organizations could primarily evolve. Therefore, it is crucial that
we also focus on ways to ensure this stage of lawmaking is democratic and legitimate.
Even when national governments determine that trade policy
and agreements should be negotiated in secret or soldy by the executive. branch, once the agreement is reached this original decision should not preclude citizen involvement in the enforcement
120

-

.

Karen J. Alter, Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"?: European Govern·
ments and the European Court of justice, 52 lNT'L ORG. 121 (1998); Geoffrey
Garrett, The Politics of Lew!! Integration in the EU, 49 INT'L ORG. 171 (1995);
Geoffrey Garrett et a!., 1'IJe Eurp~n Court ofJustice, National Governments,
and Lef!f'l Integration in the EU, 52 INT'L ORG. 149 (1998); Walter Mattli and
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Law and Politics in the EU: A Reply to Garrett Union, 49
INT'L ORG. 183 (1995); Andrew Moravscik, Negotiating_ the Single European Act,
45 INT'L ORG. 19 (1991); Weiler, The Transformation ojEurope, supra note 3.
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stage. Legislating original law and resolving disputes about that
law are two separate functions. As I noted earlier, the debate over
the "democracy deficit" in the EU focuses on the first function.
We should also look to the second function and recognize the importance of dispute resolution.

4.2.

Individual Involvement Promotes Legitimacy

There are several specific ways in which granting standing to
private actors can remedy typical conflicts in a national government. First, giving private actors the right to bring cases, rather
than requiring them to lobby or petition the government to take
actio~ tliminates ~he problem of captl~r~ at th_e dispute resolution
stage. 2 Otherwise, only states participate m the process and,
therefore, rely on political pressures to' determine whether to pursue violations of trade agreements. Understandably, a state will
not choose to spend its limited attention and energy on trade
problems which have little impact on the domestic economy.
States will weigh the impact on certain industries, the political
clout of those industries, and pressures from other domestic constituencies before embarking on negotiations. A state may not
even know of any violation until a domestic interest alerts them.
For example, if a company in the US feels that another state is
violating the GATT rules, it must petition the USTR under the
301 procedure in order to pursue a judicial remedy. The USTR
must then make a decision as to whether it is worth the time and
energy to pursue a remedy through the ·WTO. This procedure
probably operates,very well for the "Kodaks" and "ffiMs" of the
world, but if the company affected by the violations is relatively
small, lacks political influence or power, or has not suffered large
losses, the USTR could, legitimately, conclude that out of the

121

·
Of course, there is always the issue of adjudicatory capture in which interest gr'!ups are able to use the judicial syste':l' for their own interests.. One
example m the context of trade dispute resolution could be the EU where public interest groups in Great Britam have used the EU in order to advance
changes in the domestic law. See Catherine Barnard, A European Litigation
Strategy: 7be O.Se of the Equal Opportunities Commission, in NEW LEGAL
DYNAMICS OF EU 253 ijo Shaw &"IJillian More eds, 1995); see also Mattli &
Slaughter, supra note 71, at 185-190 (1998). Another example could be if environmental NGO's use NAFTA to force Mexico to comply with its own envi·
ronmental laws. See Atik, supra note 26.
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numerous trade violations it polices, this particular violation is
not worth the government's limited resources.
A government may also choose not to bring a case because it
does not want the violation addressed. A state could decide not to
bring a case against a particular state for political reasons in dealing with that state or because other domestic interests would prefer to keep the law unchanged. Furthermore, intergovernmental
pressure may result in cases not being brought to the international
adjudicatory body. The best example of this is the controversy
over the Helms-Burton law, which restricts trade with Cuba and
punishes those who engage in such trade. 122 The EU initially
lodged a complaint with the WTO, which has repeatedly postponed the issue to allow the EU and the United States time to negotiate. There is no doubt that domestic pressure in the United
States has led to the United States placing pressure on the EU not
to pursue the case. In this way, the WTO has become politicized.
Rather than aajudicating appropriate restrictions on trade, the forum is hijacked by the domestic pressure and politics of U.S. policy towards Cuba. If there were private actor standing in the
WTO, this case would already be in the process of being heard.
Furthermore, giving private actors standing may be the best
method of ensuring that their own state actually follows the trade
123
agreement.
For example, under the current system, it is unlikely that the United States or any other state would agree to
bring a case against itself in the WTO. One only has to examine
the jurisprudence of the ECJ to recognize that the right to bring
cases in the EU has resulted, as often as not, in private actors suing their own government for violations of EU law. 124 This ensures that a commitment to trade liberalization is not later overridden by specific exceptions or changes to the law agreed to by
122 For an explanation of.the Helms·B)!rton Act, its domestic and international effect, and foreign responses, see Symposium, 20 The Helms-Burton Act:
Domestic Initiatives ana Foreign Responses, HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
713-814 (1997).
.
123
See Robert Cover, The Uses ofjurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideol·

ogy, and Innovation, in

NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE EssAYS

COVER 51-93 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992) (arguing that jurisdictional redundancy, as ex!Sts between the federal and state ~stem in the U.S.
and also between die domestic systems and the EU, can effectively deal with
the problems of the elite in a J?Olitical system and is an appropriate method of
dealmg with conflicting values 1n a society.)
ee scusswn supra sectwn 3.2.4.
OF ROBERT
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!awmakeffs under pressure from powerful and narrow lobbying
mterests.
In addition, individual involvement will also lead to increased
transparency and use of the dispute resolution system. Transparency of procedures and decisions is a crucial part of building the
legitimacy of any organization. As private actors use the system
and become comfortable with the rules, it will build momentum
and its use will increase. This promotes understanding and, in the
end, confirms the legitimacy of the organization and its procedures.
Finally, examining the role of private actors in dispute resolution is consistent with a liberal IR approach. The level of individual participation can vary with each of factors examined in
Section 3. This level of participation clearly affects how governments order their preferences and which segments of society are
most represented in dispute resolution. Increased individual involvement would certainly broaden the spectrum of society sorepresented, and perhaps affect government preferences to act
more legitimately in its own decisionmaking.
4.3.

Individual Participation Will Increase the Effectiveness of
International Organizations

Granting private actors standing will also promote the effectiveness of the underlying trade agreement. Private actors can
make the determination when a violation is of sufficient harm to
bring a case. We neither rely on states policing one another, with
all of the attendant political concerns, nor rely on an oversight
body, which may have political concerns and limited resources or
research capabilities. Better policing of a trade agreement will occur if enforcement relies on those who are most invested with
protecting their rights and benefits under the trade agreement. 126
The result of better policing is twofold. First, more enforcement actions will be brought, and second, these actions will be
narrowly tailored to deal directly with the particular law causing
harm. In the area of trade law, this direct involvement makes
sense. The trade agreements are designed to influence private ac125

See Atik, supra note 26.
See Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Resolution Under a North American Free
Trade Area: The Importance of the Domestic Legal !ietting 12 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 329,
332-333 (1987).
.
126

•
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tor behavior based on state promises. The state promises to lower
tariffs, or eliminate barriers, or reduce taxation. In exchange,
companies invest, start businesses, or increase trade. When those
state promises are broken-laws are not changed or new barriers
are erected-it is private actors who suffer the consequences. As is
the case with human rights, individuals should have some recourse.127 We have already recognized this in the area of labor
rights under the lnternati9nal Labor Organization ("ILO") and
even under the WTO for intellectual property rights. 128 Under
the ILO, workers' organizations can bring noncompliance cases
129
in the area of human rights and labor rights against a state.
Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS"), private actors will be able to bring cases in domestic courts for noncompliance. 130 It is somewhat anachronistic
and curious that trade rights should be moving in the other direction.

127

PETERSMANN, supra note 10, at 8 ("Political theory, and historical experience (e.z. in the context of EC law and of the European Convention on Hu·
111an Rights) confir111 that granting actionable rights to self-interested citizens
offers tlie most effective incentives for self-enforcing liberal constitution.").
128
See id. at 33 & 62 (1997);
129
The International Labor Organization ("ILO") utilizes a tripartite sys·
tern divided into government, employment1 and labor to promote the global
recognition of human and labor rights. The Governing Body consists of 28
government members, 14 employer members, and 14 worker members. Com·
mittees and delegations for annual conferences are similarly structured. The
ILO is unique in allowing organizations of employers or workers to allege non·
compliance comp.Jaints. azainst the contracting states. Although. private indi·
vidua!s are not allowed direct access without the backing of an established organization, the democratic proceSs is. strengthened by the employers' arid
workers' involvement. See Petersmann, ·supra· note 10, at 433-34 (cOmmenting
that the increase of private individual participation "reflect[s] the democratic
functions of internattonalliberal rules and organizations for the participation of
individual rights"). See generally HECTOR BARTOLOMEIDE LA CRUZ ET AL.,
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (1996) (providing overview of
the ILO procedures).
.
·
130
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or·
ganization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsULTS OF THE UR.UGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS. Agreement] . The
TRIPS Agreement recognizes that mtelfectual property rights are private rights.
Although implementatton is at the discretion of the members, the agreement
encourages recognition of private party participation .
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Responding to the Democracy Deficit

Of the existing models of dispute resolution, clearly the EU
provides for the most individual involvement. ~ndividuals are directly granted rights and the standing to protect those rights.
Court decisions are supreme to national law and, can be integrated directly into the domestic legal fabric. The procedures and
rulings are transparent and highly accessible to private actors. Finally, enforcement through the domestic legal system gives the
best chance that the judgments of the supranational court will be
followed. While no model of dispute resolution can be completely de-politicized, the EU best tries to ensure that member
states comply with international trade law without allowing them
to make short-term, narrow decisions about compliance.
In comparison, other trade orgartizations fall short. Investment arbitration under ICSID or UNICTRAL does provide for
limited democracy. It has the advantages of allowing investors to
bring cases against states when their rights have been violated.
Furthermore, increased enforcement of arbitration awards makes
it likely that states will comply and pay the damages awarded.
The problem with this type of model, however, is the limited
scope of the arbitration action. First, the rights provided in
Chapter 11 of NAFTA or in bilateral investment treaties are the
most basic of free trade rights. States can protect, and have protected, their most sensitive national issues and· industries in the
131
agreement in the first place.
Second,. an arbitration decision
does not change the law of the offending state and any settlement
can also be kept private if the parties so wish. In this way, a state
can choose to pay in order to continue to .break the law. Third,
since this is a single arbitration case, rather than an authoritative
court decision, a state can deal with this one instance quietly
without creating the problem of numerous cases brought on the
same issue. Although arbitration reduces the likelihood of capture somewhat in terms of the choice as to when to bring a case,
the scope of the rights and the decision are severely limited.
The WTO model also provides only Partial answers to the
questions of political capture and institutional effectiveness. The
new procedures and enforcement capabilities of the WTO are de-

•
.

131
See NAFTA, supra note 65, arts. 1120, 1138, annexes 1120.1, 1138.2, chs.
21, 32 (noting several exceptions).
·

U. Pa. f. Int'l Econ. L.

632

[Vol19:2

signed to reduce dramatically the link between trade and domestic
political interests. Once a dispute is brought to the WTO, a state
will have much less ability to avoid complying with the law. The
fault of the WTO, and other systems that rely on states to bring
cases, is that the lack of rights and the lack of standing for private
actors make the system less responsive to the citizenry and less
democratic in the end. Under the WTO, private actors must rely
on their governments to assert and defend their trading rights.
It is ironic that the EU has been the focus of the democracy
deficit debate. While I do not dispute the validity of argument in
reference to the legislative process in the EU, we need to recognize that the EU's accomplishments in providing for democracy
in its dispute resolution are unique.
4. 5.

Objections to Individual Participation

There are numerous objections to the increased participation
of private actors in international trade organizations. I will focus
on three of them.
4.5.1.

States Will Not join International Organizations

The first objection could well be that states will be more reluctant to join organizations that give their citizens such power.
Involving private actors means that the government has less control over dispute resolution and, ultimately, the legal interpretation of the treaty. 132 This distribution of power to the citizens
rather than the government can be threatening to states risky for
them.
This objection has been raised most frequently in the case of
human rights organizations. where states are reluctant to either
join the organization or are reluctant to sign the additional protocol which would permit cases being brought by their citizens. 133
Therefore, the argument goes, states will not join trade agree132

This objection has also been used in the application of extraterritorial
securities laws, where the argument has been made that the existence of private
!'laintiffs improperly moves the locus of foreign policy decisionmaking from
the executive branch to the judicial branch. See Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritarialit:y in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire CAse, 1993 SUP. CT. REV.
289, 320-21.
m For examl'le, of the 140 countries who are parties to the ICCPR only ·93
have ratified the Optional Protocol. See ICCPR, supra note 32; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 383 .
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ments if their citizens can enforce it against them. However, this
objection overlooks the key difference between these types of
agreements. Other governments create human rights treaties for
the purpose of protecting citizens from the actions of their own
government. 134 (Aliens have long had the right under international law to be protected from abuse and their home state has
long had the right to demand reparation for their harm.) One
mechanism created to protect these individual rights under human rights treaties is to allow the individual to sue his or her own
government for violation of their rights under the international
treaty.
International trade treaties, however, are completely different
in their purpose and in the benefits accruing to each state. While
human rights treaties could be characterized as ambitious in that
all states are individually responsible for protecting their citi. more of a contractual treaty Wit
.h
zens, 135 a trade agreement IS
promises and exchanges between each of the member states.
There are strong economic reasons to join these trade agreements
beyond the altruism and moral leadership that motivates signature
of human rights treaties. In addition, while private actors could
bring a case against their own government if private actor partici-

'" On example is the U.N. CHARTER:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined ... to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress

and better standards of life in large freedom ... and for these
ends ... to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples
See U.N. CHARTER, preamble. For another examples see the ICCPR, supra
note 32, pt. II, art. 2 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the ri!dtts recognized in the present Covenant."); Nigel Rodley, On
the Necessity of ihe United States Ratification of the International Human Rights
Conventions, in HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, WITH OR WITHOUT REsERVATIONS?, 3, 15 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 19852 ("I would be remiss if I did not
reaffirm the principle of the inherent desirability of providing individuals who
think they have been victimized by their governments with a forum for brin~a
ing such alleged victimization to the attention. of an international body.")
{regarding the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination).
135
See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW,
13-14 (1993).
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pation were permitted in international trade agreements, that is
hardly the sole purpose of allowing private actor participation.
Arguably, private actor standing undermines the authority of
136
the government to negotiate trade treaties.
Professor Nichols
argues that domestic groups opposing their governments would
create a "spectacle. "137 First, this assumes, somewhat condescendingly, that other states and trade bureaucracies could not distinguish between the government and private parties or interest
138
Secgroups if they took opposing sides in dispute resolution.
ond, this misses the point of a dispute resolution procedure. Dispute resolution is designed to resolve disagreements after an
agreement is signed. · The extension of standing in dispute resolution does not, for better or worse, give these private actors a voice
as the trade agreement is being negotiated.
In the end, the benefits accruing from international trade
agreements will outweigh nations' reluctance to join organizations where their own citizens could have standing. For example,
Turkey has had a traditional reluctance to reco~nize individual
1
rights and standing under human rights treaties but has apparently calculated that the economic benefit of joining the EU outweighs these concerns and so has applied for EU membership.
A separate objection could be that individual participation is
neither appropriate nor efficient given the particular goals of the
international organization. The idea that certain organizations
would not benefit from individual participation, is an important
one in evaluating when and how private actors should be involved. Clearly, a blanket statement that private actors will always improve an organization is naive. The distinction between
"facilitative" and "producing" international organizations, made
by Kenneth Abbott in outlining mesoinstitution theory, would

136

See Philip M. Nichols, supra note 22, 316-18 (1996).
See id. at 317.
138
See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by
Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
137

359, 374 (1996).
.
139
.
'
- .
Turkey has not .signed the ICCPR or the Protocol to the European
Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR") providing for individual standing. See
ICCPR, supra note 32; Protocol No. 9 to the 1950 European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force,
Oct. 1, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 140.
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perhaps shed the most light. 140 If the goal of the organization was
"facilitative"-public awareness, convening negotiations, organizing meetings-then private actor involvement appears to be less
compelling. As the goals of the organization becomes more
"producing," i.e., adjudicating behavior, creating norms, setting
negotiation agendas, and the organization is more centralized, the
importance of private actors become more compelling. These
producing organizations become lawmakers and the concerns of
democracy and legitimacy must be recognized. Perhaps one of the
reasons this debate over democracy and legitimacy has arisen in
the first place is that more trade organizations are moving along
the facilitative-producing continuum to become more important
players in the creation of international law.
4.5.2.

Individual Participation is Logistically Unfeasible

Another objection to individual participation is that the mechanics of such a srstem would overwhelm the structure of the
1
trade organization. 1 A corollary of this argument is the fear that
·there will be numerous frivolous suits or that individual participation will be limited to the wealthy. 142
·
While the logistics of involving·private actors are undoubtedly
complex, this is hardly a reason not to· set up an organization
properly. Certain standing requirements or a screening system,
such as exists with the European and Inter-American human
rights systems, 143 could be established. 144 The issue of logistics is
140
See Kenneth Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Mesoinstitutions: The Role of For·
mal Orsanizations in International Politics (unpublished manuscript on file with

authors).
141
Ambassador John McDonald notes that the bureaucracy and funding
requirements of setting up such a system should not be underestrmated. See In·
terview with John McDonald (Ambassador to International Labor Organization) {March 17, 1998); see also Nichols, supra.note 22, at 312-13 (casting doubt
on the practically of a system that would allow equitable, direct participation
by all the world's citizens).
142
See Nichols, supra note 22, at 318-19.
143
See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M.
· 673 {1970); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
1
" See ~lenT. Schleyer, Note, P01J!er to the People: Allowing Private Parties
to RaiSe Cla1rm Before the WTO DISfJute Resolution System, 65 FORD. L. REV.
2275 (proposing a Commission for Free Trade to screen disputes for the WTO);
see also Shell, supra note 138, at 375 (noting that both tlie United States Supreme Court and the E. C.J. have establislied rules regulating standing that,
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an issue of money and support for the organization. It is a question of what the member states choose to support. The expansion
of the WTO legal service in comparison to the previous service
under GATT demonstrates what can be accomplished with the
will of the governments.
The concern about the availability of the necessary resources
to pursue international remedies is a valid one. It is, however, the
same concern that should exist in the current situation where private actors need resources in order to lobby their governments.
Arguably, leaving it to each private actor to evaluate his or her
economic gains and losses from bringing a case provides for less
distortion than filtering that choice through the national government.

4. 5.3.

Trade is Politics

A final objection to individual involvement could be that the
premise behind separating trade and domestic politics is inherently flawed. This argument maintains that ultimately politics
and political interests should determine the enforcement of trade
agreements. Individual injustice, if it occurs, is not really the focus of trade policy. Trade policy focuses on the good of the state
as a whole and the government is in the best position to determine that interest. This objection goes back to the idea that diplomacy, secrecy, and negotiation are the best way to handle disputes between sovereign states. 145 The process of judicializationwhich individual involvement moves forward-is not appropriate
for trade policy.
This objection attacks the heart of how one thinks about the
international syste!ll. If trade should be bound to politics, if states
should be the focus of the international system, if diplomacy is
the best way to resolve disputes, my proposal is yet another step
on the slippery slope of giving more power to citizens and eroding the sovereignty of states. On the other hand, if increased legalization and judicialization of international law make the international system more effective and more responsive, 146 then this

while not perfect, are sufficient to satisfy participants in the system that decisions are not political judgments).
145
N'hl
1c o s, supra note 22, at 319.
146 See Petersmann, supra note 95 (explaining the importance of increased
judicialization in the GATT context).
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proposal might hold some interest. 147 It is really a question of
one's views the continuing evolution of the international system.
Increased legitimacy and democracy are appropriate goals under a
view of liberal governance.
5.

CONCLUSION

The article intended to demonstrate two things. My first goal
was to turn the focus to dispute resolution as a way of dealing
with some of the traditional critiques of international trade organizations. Increasing individual participation addresses the liberal international relations goals of examining the role of private
actors behind the state. Individual participation can also be used
as a measure for democracy and legitimacy of trade organizations.
Finally, I argue individual participation can help reduce the issue
of capture.
•
My second goal was illustrating that as regional and international organizations are created, states should examine carefully
the type of dispute resolution mechanism they establish. 148 International trade organizations diminish the returns of the treaty by
limiting their dispute resolution mechanisms to states. By providing rights without a remedy, these international trade organizations are limiting both their impact and their legitimacy. The solution is to reduce the link between domestic or short-term
147

See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Rer;olution, 17
U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 33, 58 (1996) (arguing that judicial institutions make
international trade agreements more binding ana more attractive); see also Steve
Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade
Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 331, 343-46 (1996) (arguinjl that increased transparency of the WTO system is inevitable and al'propriate); G.
Richard Shell, supra note 138, at 374 (arguing that issues which ptt governments
nst. interest groups will not result in
against governments and governments
confusion on the position of each entity ;YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra
note 21, at 86-106 (discussing how the evelopment of"minilateralism" or the
creation of supranational institutions for small groups of countries leads to
more effective trade liberalism).
'" Some focus has already been given to the 'mpact of different dispute
resolution mechanisms on emerging or~;anizations and I this will hopefully continue. See Taylor, supra note 70 (exarmning NAFTA and MERCOSUR); Garcia, supra !'ote 11 (analyz~g t~e Free Trade Ar~ of the Americas ("FTAA")
and applymg the mesomstttuttonal theory); Davtd Lopez, Dzspute kesolutton

!.

under a Free Trade Area of the Americas: The Shape of Things to Come, 28INTERAM. L. REv. 597 (1997) (discussing the alternatives for developing a dispute
resolution mechanism under theFT AA).
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political interests of states and their.trade policy by granting private actors standing to bring cases for treaty violation.
The arguable purpose of international trade treaties is broad
encouragement of trade by requiring, at the outset, that member
states do not take actions that would adversely affect individual
players. The rights provided in these treaties and the benefits
therefrom accrue most directly to private actors, and only to their
governments indirectly through better economies, more tax income, and reelection. The benefits of trade treaties are best protected and enforced by those most directly affected.
To examine the EU, although it poses its own questions about
the democracy deficit, is to observe an international organization
committed to ensuring that the guidelines set forth in the Treaty
of Rome are followed. The dispute resolution system in the EU
guarantees more compliance by allowing private actors directly
affected by each country's actions to bring cases in the nation:il
courts {and in certain cases to the ECJ directly).
This result allows for the use of private attorneys general to
enforce the law based on their own assessment of the harm they
are suffering and the cost of litigation devoid ofpolitical concerns.
In the EU system, we do not rely on states, each of which may
have an interest in allowing others to continue violating the treaty
or may not want to bring a case against another state for political
reasons. When we are left to rely on states to enforce the law under a trade treaty we are left with an incomplete system.
If states are actually committed to the trade treaties they sign
and to bringing the benefits of those treaties to their constituents,
they must allow their own citizens to bring cases directly to the
dispute. resolution mechanism established under the treaty.; Furthermore, these cases should not be decided under arbitration, as
is the system under NAFTA for investor disputes. An everchanging arbitration panel creates neither a uniform body of law
nor precedent and, in the end, can never carry the weight of an
international standing body.
As the number of regional and international trade agreements
grows, their dispute resolution mechanisms will only increase in
importance. In order to ensure real change in the trade laws and
real compliance by the constituent states; we must provide for individual standing. Rights without a remedy are hollow rights.

